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Abstract
Medicare coverage policies of medical procedures can be promulgated at a
national level by the Centers of Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) as National
Coverage Determinations (NCDs) or at a local level by Medicare contractors as Local
Coverage Determinations (LCDs).
Although LCDs shouldn't contradict NCDs, they can differ. In the present
study, I analyze some factors that could partially account for the differences
between NCDs and LCDs.
Using the Medicare Coverage Database from CMS, I searched for differences
between NCDs and LCDs in five benefit categories: inpatient hospital services,
durable medical devices, diagnostic laboratory tests, physician's services and other
diagnostic tests.
There is a reasonable degree of homogeneity in coverage policies for
procedures for which an NCD has been issued: 82% are exactly the same. Most of
the differences took the form of exclusions from LCDs, but not from NCDs.
For each state, I computed the number of times that LCDs were issued and
the number of times that LCDs differed from NCDs and searched for possible linear
or exponential correlation models. The following factors were initially hypothesized
to account for these differences: number of Schools of Medicine, number of
physicians, GDP per capita by state, state ranking according to number of Level 1
and Level 2 Trauma Centers and the profile of MEDCAC members.
At a national level, I found no correlation between the number of LCDs issued
or the number of differences between LCDs and NCDs and any of these variables.
However, on a sub-analysis at a local level, in some regions I found a positive
correlation (r2 >.94) between the following three variables: 1) number of Schools of
Medicine, 2) number of physicians, and 3) state ranking according to the number of
Level 1 and Level 2 Trauma Centers and the following two parameters: 1) the level
of LCD issuing activity, and 2) the number of times that LCDs differ from NCDs.
The correlations shown by the performed sub-analysis within regions may
imply that more LCDs are issued to restrict coverage when there is a local need to
control the excessive demand partially driven by the higher number of hospitals and
physicians that are active in pursuing their interests. The fact that these correlations
were shown only at a regional level may indicate that when local factors are
disregarded, the original hypothesized factors do influence LCD activity, however, at
a national level, other hypothetical local factors may have a greater influence on LCD
activity and policy discrepancies.
In order to have a better understanding of my results and the factors that
could account for the differences between NCDs and LCDs, I interviewed four
Contractor Medical Directors (CMDs). These interviews indicated that other factors
could account for these differences, including the following: a history of abuse and
fraud, contractor's budgets, the CMD's special interests and experience, data
analysis capabilities, the number of claims and the novelty of the procedure. The
impact of these variables on the differences between national and local coverage
policies can be an interesting topic for future research on the subject.
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I. Introduction
Reimbursement is often cited by healthcare entrepreneurs, investors
and managers as a key factor for the success or failure of adoption of medical
technologies. In terms of value creation, reimbursement is more important
for medical devices and diagnostics for which FDA approval usually
represents a lower risk than pharmaceuticals or biologics. Manufacturers of
medical technologies often report that Medicare is the most influential payer
not only in terms of market power but also in its influence on other payer's
coverage policies. In the same way, positive coverage decisions by the largest
and most influential private payers can also influence decisions from other
private payers.
Research Objectives
In some cases, Medicare or its contractors issue coverage policies to
determine if a specific procedure or medical technology will receive
reimbursement and under which circumstances. These policies can be stated
at a national or at a local level.
National Coverage Determinations (NCDs) are policies developed by the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to direct the nationwide
conditions for Medicare coverage for a specific item or service. The decision is
usually made at CMS Staff discretion based on benefit categories and
statutory exclusions previously defined by the Social Security Act and on an
assessment of whether the service or item is reasonable and necessary. For
some services, CMS bases its decisions on Technology Assessments (TAs) or
on the judgment of the Medicare Evidence Development & Coverage Advisory
Committee (MEDCAC).
On the other hand, Local Coverage Determinations (LCDs) are coverage
policies developed by Medicare contractors to decide whether to cover a
particular service in their jurisdiction. They can be developed in the absence
of an NCD or as a supplement to an NCD as long as the LCD policy does not
conflict with national policy. The contractor makes the decision based on an
assessment of whether the service is reasonable or necessary. LCDs are more
specific administrative and educational tools to assist providers in submitting
correct claims for payment, including the acceptable billing codes, which
usually are not mentioned in NCDs because they are broader in scope. The
vast majority of coverage policies are developed by contractors locally.
Sometimes NCDs are released after various LCDs have been issued for the
same service by different contractors, indicating the necessity to regulate
coverage at a national level. This is the reason why there are more than five
thousand LCDs and only 314 NCDs currently in effect. LCDs are used as a way
to implement automated review for those circumstances under which
coverage for a service will always be denied. LCDs take significantly less time
than NCDs to develop (approximately 4 months vs 9-12 months), particularly
if NCDs require TAs or MEDCACs.
According to CMS, LCDs shouldn't contradict NCDs, but in reality they present
some differences, although not strictly contradictions. The ultimate aim of
this research is to describe the factors that account for the differences
between local and national coverage determinations of medical procedures in
the US.
Significance, utility and implications of this research
The present thesis will be relevant for any person interested in the US health
care industry. It will help policy makers and payers understand the drivers of
coverage disparities between different US regions or states, to propose new
administrative or policy tools that improve their cost, effectiveness, quality,
uniformity and accessibility standards. It will help health technology
entrepreneurs, investors and managers by shedding light on the factors that
have to be taken into account in order to obtain more favorable
reimbursement. For the general population, this study will help to explain the
variables that account for the difference in coverage decisions and policies,
for insurance purchasing or other purposes.
Background
Medicare Coverage Decisions
With a 2010 budget of approximately $460 billion and serving nearly 46
million beneficiaries, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) are
a key player in the US health care system. CMS defines coverage, coding, and
payment processes and how they relate to each other. Payment for many new
medical technologies can be made under one of Medicare's payment
methodologies without being preceded by an explicit coverage determination,
coding change, and/or payment decision by CMS. However, the Agency will
specifically evaluate issues involving coverage, coding, and/or payment with
respect to certain technologies. According to the CMS Innovator's Guide to
Navigating Medicare (Version 2.0, 2010), the basic analytical framework that
CMS uses for each of these issues is as followsi:
1) Coverage
Medicare's authority to cover or exclude certain items or services is
governed by the Social Security Act (the Act) and implementing regulations.
Benefit Category - Does the new technology fall into at least one defined
benefit category or categories under the Act?
Statutory Exclusion - Does the new technology involve an item or
service that is specifically excluded by the Act?
Reasonable and Necessary - Is the new technology "reasonable and
necessary" for the diagnosis or treatment of illness or injury, or to improve
the functioning of a malformed body member?
2) Coding
Clinically Different - Are changes in coding needed to accommodate the
new technology? In most cases, new items and services are adequately
described in existing codes. However, some new technologies may warrant
differentiation through the creation of new codes.
3) Payment
Payment System - Which fee-for-service payment system(s) does the
new technology fit into (e.g., hospital inpatient prospective payment system,
physician fee schedule)?
Payment Amount - If the new technology warrants a new code, how
will the payment amount be determined?
Coverage"i
Fiscal intermediaries and carriers are legal entities that have contracted with
CMS to process Medicare claims for Part A and Part B. In December 2003,
Congress passed the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act (MMA) of 2003. Under section 911 of the MMA, Congress
requires that, between year 2005 and 2011, CMS replace the current fiscal
intermediary (FI) and carrier contracts with competitively procured
contracts that conform to the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). New
contracting entities known as Medicare Administrative Contractors (MACs)
will merge Part A and Part B claims processing under a single authority. The
provisions contained under section 911 are collectively referred to as
Medicare Contracting Reform and its main purpose is to make Medicare's
administrative structure more dynamic, competitive and performance-based.
Under the new structure, most beneficiaries will have their claims processed
by only one contractor, which will be required to develop an integrated and
consistent approach to medical coverage across its service area. The full fee-
for-service (FFS) program functional environment vision includes functional
contractors working with the MACs. The major business functions of the
MACs are: claims processing, beneficiary and provider customer service,
appeals, provider education, financial management, provider enrollment,
reimbursement, payment safeguards and information systems security. They
will serve as the providers' primary point-of-contact for enrollment, training
on Medicare coverage and billing requirements, and the receipt, processing,
and payment of Medicare FFS claims within their respective jurisdictions.
The new contracting reform created new jurisdictions to be administered by
the MACs, which were assigned to balance the allocation of workloads (the
number of fee-for-service beneficiaries and providers) and promote
competitionili. CMS has awarded 19 MACs through a competitive bidding
process during the initial implementation phase. These include 15 A/B MACs
servicing the majority of all types of providers (both Part A and Part B), and
four specialty MACs servicing durable medical equipment suppliers.
The fifteen jurisdictions and its A/B contractors areili:
* Jurisdiction 1 (J1) - American Samoa, California, Guam, Hawaii,
Nevada, Northern Mariana Islands- Awarded to Palmetto GBA
* Jurisdiction 2 (J2) - Alaska, Idaho, Oregon, Washington Awarded
to National Heritage Insurance Company
* Jurisdiction 3 (J3) - Arizona, Montana, North Dakota, South
Dakota, Utah, Wyoming- Awarded to Noridian Administrative
Services
- Jurisdiction 4 (J4) - Colorado, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas-
Awarded to Trailblazers Health Enterprises
* Jurisdiction 5 (J5) - Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska- Awarded
to Wisconsin Physician Services Health Insurance Corporation
* Jurisdiction 6 (J6) - Illinois, Minnesota, Wisconsin. Awarded to
Noridian Administrative Services, LLC
e Jurisdiction 7 (J7) - Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi. Awarded to
Pinnacle Business Solutions Inc.
* Jurisdiction 8 (J8) - Indiana, Michigan. Awarded to National
Government Services, Inc. On January 26, 2009, a protest against
the award was filed. CMS is undertaking corrective action on the
award. The legacy fiscal intermediaries and carriers will
continue to service the providers in those workloads until
further notice.
* Jurisdiction 9 (J9) - Florida, Puerto Rico, United States Virgin
Islands. Awarded to First Coast Service Options, Inc.
e Jurisdiction 10 (J10) - Alabama, Georgia, Tennessee. Awarded to
Cahaba Government Benefit Administrators, LLC (Cahaba GBA)
* Jurisdiction 11 (J11) - North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia,
West Virginia Awarded to Palmetto Government Benefits
Administrator, LLC (Palmetto GBA). On June 1, 2010 CIGNA
Government Services filed a protest against the award. The
legacy fiscal intermediaries and carriers will continue to service
the providers until further notice.
- Jurisdiction 12 (J12) - Delaware, District of Columbia, Maryland,
New Jersey, Pennsylvania -Awarded to Highmark Medicare
Services Inc.
- Jurisdiction 13 (J13) - Connecticut, New York- Awarded to
National Government Services
- Jurisdiction 14 (J14) - Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire-
Awarded to National Heritage Insurance Corporation (NHIC)
* Jurisdiction 15 (J15) - Kentucky, Ohio. Awarded to Highmark
Medicare Services, Inc. (HMS). Two protests against the award
were filed. CMS is undertaking corrective action on the award.
The legacy fiscal intermediaries and carriers will continue to
service the providers in those jurisdictions until further notice.
The four jurisdictions for Durable Medical Equipment (DME) Specialty MAC
carriers aremii:
* Jurisdiction A- Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont. Awarded
to National Heritage Insurance Company
* Jurisdiction B- Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota,
Ohio, and Wisconsin. Awarded to AdminaStar Federal
Jurisdiction C- Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia,
Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma,
Puerto Rico, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, U.S. Virgin
Islands, Virginia, and West Virginia. Awarded to CIGNA
Government Services
Jurisdiction D- Alaska, American Samoa, Arizona, California,
Guam, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Northern Mariana Islands,
Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.
Awarded to Noridian Administrative Services
CMS and its administrative contractors, have the authority to develop
coverage determinations for particular items or services or to decide claims
on a case-by-case basis. Most coverage policies are developed at a local level
by contractors, but sometimes CMS may choose to develop a national
coverage policy to ensure that similar claims will be adjudicated under
uniform criteria. Coverage policies are more likely to be developed when the
item or service produces significant clinical consequences for beneficiaries,
when the medical community is divided about the merits of an item or service
for a particular population, or when the item or service has a significant
impact on the Medicare programi.
A Medicare administrative contractor develops Local Coverage
Determinations (LCDs) that apply only within their jurisdictions.
Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) consider LCDs but are not bound to follow
them. CMS makes National Coverage Determinations (NCDs) that are binding
policies for all fiscal intermediaries, carriers, MACs, Quality Improvement
Organizations (QIOs), Quality Independent Contractors (QICs), ALJs, and the
Medicare Appeals Councili.
Codingi
Currently, CMS uses the International Classification of Diseases, 9th Edition,
Clinical Modification (ICD-9-CM) and the Healthcare Common Procedure
Coding System (HCPCS) for processing Medicare claims. The updated
International Classification of Diseases, 10th Edition (ICD-10) is scheduled for
implementation on October 1, 2013. In contrast to coverage decisions,
changes to coding systems are made strictly at the national level. New
technologies are sometimes adequately described by existing codes. Under
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA),
contractors can no longer establish local codes, although new technologies
are sometimes accommodated by 'not otherwise classified' codes pending
determination of a new code assignment.
Paymenti
Payment levels for most of Medicare's fee-for-service payment systems are
structured to gradually adjust to the use of a new technology, and in general
do not require major modifications. In the end, the relative use of a new
technology will be reflected in payments for the service using the technology.
However, in certain cases, payment adjustments for new technologies are
appropriate. Medicare's inpatient and outpatient prospective payment
systems include provisions designed to provide an extra payment amount for
certain new technologies, based on whether the new technology represents a
substantial clinical improvement relative to existing technologies and meet
specific cost thresholds. However, under the outpatient prospective payment
system, a service may be assigned to a new technology Ambulatory Payment
Classification (APC) group and a new drug may receive "pass-through"
payment without demonstrating substantial clinical improvement.
Timing of Policy Decisionsi
Coverage, coding, and payment decisions are not necessarily made in any
particular order. Sometimes a new technology manufacturer secures a new
code before Medicare coverage, or applies for a new technology hospital
inpatient add-on payment before FDA has approved the device, anticipating
that FDA will grant approval before CMS makes its coverage decisions.
Timelines for Medicare coding, coverage and payment decisions may often
span a 12-month period. Local and national coverage decisions are made
under statutory timeframes, usually taking between 4 and 12 months. Coding
changes are commonly made on an annual basis, while some payment
changes may occur quarterly.
National Coverage Determination (NCD)i
NCDs are developed by CMS to describe the nationwide conditions for
Medicare coverage for a specific item or service. NCDs generally outline the
conditions for which an item or service is considered to be covered (or not
covered) under section 1862(a)(1) of the Social Security Act or other
applicable provisions of the Act. NCDs are issued as program instructions.
Once published in a CMS program instruction, an NCD is binding on all
Medicare Administrative Contractors (MACs), fiscal intermediaries, carriers,
Quality Improvement Organizations (QIOs), Qualified Independent
Contractors (QICs), Administrative Law Judges (ALJs), the Medicare Appeals
Council and Program Safeguard Contractors (PSCs). Medicare Advantage
(Part C) health plans are required to cover all items and services that are
offered under Part A and Part B, which comply with NCDs, while Medicare
Part D plans are excluded from the requirement of following NCDs.
NCD Processiiv
The NCD process consists of three major steps: initiation, review, and
completion. A formal request for an NCD can be initiated either by an outside
party or internally by CMS staff. However, CMS formally initiates the NCD
process by "opening" the NCD. This is announced to the public by posting a
"tracking sheet" on the CMS coverage web site. After that, CMS reviews the
particular items and services to determine whether they meet the statutory
requirements.
Time frames required for the NCD process are statutory, as mandated by the
Medicare Modernization Act (MMA). The time frame does not begin until CMS
formally accepts an NCD request. When the volume of formal requests is
heavy, CMS may set priorities - reviewing applications for technologies likely
to have a greater impact on the Medicare program and its beneficiaries before
those with lesser impacts. Once a completed request is accepted, CMS notifies
the requester and posts a tracking sheet announcing the NCD review on the
CMS coverage website.
For NCD requests not requiring an external technology assessment (TA) or
Medicare Evidence Development & Coverage Advisory Committee (MEDCAC)
review, CMS must post a proposed decision no later than six months after the
date CMS accepts the completed formal request. For NCDs that require either
a TA or MEDCAC review, or both, the proposed decision must be posted no
later than nine months after the date CMS accepts the completed request.
Before the final decision is reached, CMS staff considers any public comments
that may be relevant to the policies. When an NCD currently exists, any
individual or entity may request CMS to reconsider any provision of that NCD.
The reconsideration request must contain additional medical or scientific
information that was not considered during the NCD process or arguments to
prove that the NCD misinterpreted the existing evidence. There is also a
process by which aggrieved parties may elect to challenge an existing NCD.
The NCO process and some factors that may Influence it
Technology Assessmen tsi
Technology Assessments (TAs) are systematic reviews, conducted and
coordinated by CMS staff to review relevant evidence and inform a
determination if the item or service is reasonable and necessary. CMS usually
requests TAs when there is conflicting or complex medical and scientific
literature available, or when CMS believes an independent analysis of all
relevant literature will assist them determine whether an item or procedure
is reasonable and necessaryiv. To minimize bias, systematic reviews
emphasize a comprehensive search of all potentially relevant medical and
scientific articles and use explicit, reproducible criteria in the selection of
articles for review. Primary research designs and study characteristics are
appraised in accordance with a hierarchy of medical evidence. Data are
summarized and the evidence is appraised to assess its validity (how credible
it is), clinical relevance (its applicability in real health care settings), and
weight (magnitude of effect). CMS staff generally performs TAs internally but
may contract with an external party to perform a TA.
Medicare Evidence Development & Coverage Advisory Committee (MEDCAC)
For coverage topics that are highly controversial or have a major potential
impact (cost being an important factor) on the Medicare program or its
beneficiaries, CMS may draw on the expertise of the MEDCAC. The primary
role of the MEDCAC is to provide independent, expert advice to assist CMS in
making sound coverage decisions for the topic under review. The MEDCAC
reviews and evaluates medical literature and TAs, listens to testimony,
deliberates, and provides CMS with recommendations as to the strength of
the evidence reviewed.
The MEDCAC is composed of 100 experts in clinical and administrative
medicine, biologic and physical sciences, public health administration, patient
advocacy, health care data and information management and analysis, health
care economics and medical ethics. For each MEDCAC meeting, approximately
15 members are selected with knowledge specific to the topic in question.
These can be non-MEDCAC members who have relevant expertise to provide
additional input to panel members. The panel meets in a public forum
approximately 6 times a year to review medical evidence for the topic under
deliberation, listen to public testimony, and provide advice about the quality
of the evidence.
Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC)v
The Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) is an independent
Congressional agency established by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (P.L.
105-33) to advise the US Congress on issues affecting the Medicare Program.
The Commission's statutory mandate is quite broad: in addition-to advising
the Congress on payments to private health plans participating in Medicare
and providers in Medicare's traditional fee-for-service program, MedPAC is
also tasked with analyzing access to care, quality of care, and other issues
affecting Medicare.
The Commission has 17 members, who have diverse expertise in the
financing and delivery of health care services. Commissioners are appointed
to three-year terms (subject to renewal) by the Comptroller General and
serve part time. Appointments are staggered; the terms of five or six
Commissioners expire each year. The Commission is supported by an
executive director and a staff of analysts, who typically have backgrounds in
economics, health policy, public health or policy.
MedPAC meets publicly to discuss policy issues and formulate its
recommendations to the Congress. In the course of these meetings,
Commissioners consider the results of staff research, presentations by policy
experts, and comments from interested parties. Commission members and
staff also seek input on Medicare issues through frequent meetings with
individuals interested in the program, including staff from congressional
committees and CMS, health care researchers, health care providers, and
beneficiary advocates.
Two reports - issued in March and June each year - are the primary outlet for
Commission recommendations. In addition to these reports and others on
subjects requested by the Congress, MedPAC advises the Congress through
other avenues, including comments on reports and proposed regulations
issued by the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services,
testimony, and briefings for congressional staff.
Currently, MedPAC is only an advisory Commission with no formal power to
make decisions. However, a 2009 bill introduced by Senator Jay Rockefeller
and endorsed by the Obama administration, proposes moving decisions from
Congress to MedPAC, turning it into an executive agency. The bill has caused a
lot of controversy, because, among other things, it would cease the influence
that industry, hospitals and physicians play in policy making through
lobbying with members of Congress.
NCD Implementationi
The NCD is the formal instruction to the Medicare claims processing
contractors regarding how to process claims (e.g., when to pay, when not to
pay, pay only when certain clinical conditions are met). Appropriate payment
or other changes to accommodate the coverage decision are effective at the
time a final decision is posted to the CMS website. In some instances CMS
implements an NCD through the change management process and provides
detailed coding and billing instructions. The instructions specify appropriate
coding and detail how the NCD criteria are to be implemented in the claims
processing systems. Those instructions have a specific effective date dictating
when claims will be processed according to the new criteria. The contractors
implement the NCD within their own jurisdictions and may subsequently
develop LCDs or policy articles to supplement the NCD.
Coverage with Evidence Developmenti
Coverage with Evidence Development (CED) is a coverage decision made
through an NCD. These NCDs require additional data collection, such as data
collected in a clinical trial, as a condition of coverage. The purpose of CED is to
provide Medicare coverage for a particular item or service and to develop
evidence of its impact on the health of Medicare beneficiaries. Examples of
NCDs that require CED are Continuous Positive Airway Pressure Therapy for
Obstructive Sleep Apnea and Positron Emission Tomography for Solid
Tumors and Myeloma.
Local Coverage Determination (LCD)vi
Section 522 of the Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Benefits Improvement and
Protection Act of 2000 (BIPA) created and defined the term "local coverage
determination" (LCD) as a decision by a contractor whether to cover a
particular service on a contractor-wide basis. LCDs may be developed in the
absence of an NCD or as a supplement to an NCD as long as the LCD policy
does not conflict with national policy. Since Administrative Law Judges (ALJs)
are bound by NCDs but not LCDs, simply repeating an NCD as an LCD will
cause confusion as to the standing of the policy. Contractors are supposed to
apply NCDs when reviewing claims for services addressed by NCDs. The
contractor should ensure that all LCDs are consistent with all statutes,
rulings, regulations, and national coverage, payment, and coding policies.
LCDs specify the clinical circumstances under which a service is considered to
be reasonable and necessary. They are administrative and educational tools
which assist providers in submitting correct claims for payment and guide the
medical community and others within their jurisdictions. Contractors develop
LCDs by considering medical literature, the advice of local medical societies
and medical consultants, public comments, and comments from the provider
community. Contractors educate the provider community on new or
significantly revised LCDs through such things as training sessions, speaking
at meetings or writing articles in the newsletters.
Medicare contractors previously developed Local Medical Review Policies
(LMRPs) as vehicles for local policy. In 2003, CMS instructed the contractors
to create LCDs and convert all LMRPs into LCDs. The difference between
LMRPs and LCDs is that LCDs consist of only "reasonable and necessary"
information, while LMRPs may also have contained benefit category and
statutory exclusion provisions. Therefore, CMS further instructed that all
other guidance from contractors should be published in a contractor article.
Codes describing what is covered and what is not covered can be part of the
LCD. This includes lists of HCPCs codes that spell out which services the LCD
applies to, lists of ICD-9-CM codes for which the service is covered, lists of
ICD-9 codes for which the service is not considered reasonable and necessary,
etc. These coding descriptions are only included if they are integral to the
discussion of medical necessity. However, coding guidelines are not elements
of LCDs and Medicare states that they should be deleted from the LCDs and
instead published in articles.
When a new or revised LCD is needed, contractors do the following:
* Contact the CMD facilitation contractor, other contractors, the local
carrier or intermediary, the Durable Medical Equipment Regional
Carrier (DMERC) (if applicable), the Medicare Coverage Database
or QIOs to inquire if a policy which addresses the issue in question
already exists;
0 Adopt or adapt an existing LCD, if possible; or
- Develop a policy if no policy exists or an existing policy cannot be
adapted to the specific situation.
A contractor with LCD jurisdiction for two or more states is strongly
encouraged by CMS to develop uniform LCDs across all its jurisdictions. To
ensure that all LCDs remain accurate and up-to-date at all times, at least
annually, contractors review and revise LCDs based upon CMS NCDs,
coverage provisions in interpretive manuals, national payment policies and
national coding policies.
Contractors may review claims on either a prepayment or post-payment basis
regardless of whether an NCD, coverage provision in an interpretive manual,
or LCD exists for that service. However, automated denials can be made only
when a clear policy exists. The use of an LCD helps avoid situations in which
claims are paid or denied without a provider having a full understanding of
the basis for payment and denial. In this way, contractors develop LCDs when
they have identified a service that is never covered under certain
circumstances and wish to establish automated review in the absence of an
NCD or coverage provision in an interpretive manual that supports
automated review.
Contractors have the option to develop LCDs when any of the following occur:
A validated widespread problem demonstrates a significant risk
to the Medicare trust funds (identified or potentially high dollar
and/or high volume services). Multi-state contractors may
develop uniform LCDs across all its jurisdictions even if data
analysis indicates that the problem exists only in one state.
* An LCD is needed to assure beneficiary access to care.
- A contractor has assumed the LCD development workload of
another contractor and is undertaking an initiative to create
uniform LCDs across its multiple jurisdictions; or is a multi-state
contractor undertaking an initiative to create uniform LCDs
across its jurisdiction.
* Frequent denials are issued (following routine or complex
review) or frequent denials are anticipated.
According to CMS, LCDs are supposed to be clear, concise, properly formatted
and not restrict or conflict with NCDs or coverage provisions in interpretive
manuals. Coverage provisions in interpretive manuals are instructions that
are used to further define when and under what circumstances services may
be covered (or not covered). If an NCD or coverage provision in an
interpretive manual states that a given item is "covered for
diagnoses/conditions A, B and C," contractors are not supposed to use that as
a basis to develop LCDs to cover only "diagnoses/conditions A, B and C."
When an NCD or coverage provision in an interpretive manual does not
exclude coverage for other diagnoses/conditions, contractors usually allow
for individual consideration unless the LCD supports automatic denial for
some or all of those other diagnoses/conditions.
In order to be covered under Medicare, a service shall be reasonable and
necessary. According to the CMS Manual System, contractors shall consider a
service to be reasonable and necessary if the contractor determines that the
service is:
* Safe and effective;
* Not experimental or investigational (exception: routine costs of
qualifying clinical trial services with dates of service on or after
September 19, 2000 which meet the requirements of the Clinical
Trials NCD are considered reasonable and necessary); and
e Appropriate, including the duration and frequency that is
considered appropriate for the service, in terms of whether it is:
- Furnished in accordance with accepted standards of
medical practice for the diagnosis or treatment of the
patient's condition or to improve the function of a
malformed body member;
- Furnished in a setting appropriate to the patient's
medical needs and condition; or
- Ordered and furnished by qualified personnel;
- One that meets, but does not exceed, the patient's
medical need; and
- At least as beneficial as an existing and available
medically appropriate alternative.
LCDs are based on the strongest evidence available. The initial action in
gathering evidence to support LCDs has to be always a search of published
scientific literature for any available evidence pertaining to the item/service
in question. In order of preference, LCDs are based on:
* Published authoritative evidence derived from definitive
randomized clinical trials or other definitive studies, and
General acceptance by the medical community (standard of
practice), as supported by sound medical evidence based on:
- Scientific data or research studies published in peer-
reviewed medical journals;
- Consensus of expert medical opinion (i.e., recognized
authorities in the field); or
- Medical opinion derived from consultations with medical
associations or other health care experts.
Contractors sometimes implement new Least Costly Alternative (LCA)
determinations through an LCD. "Least Costly Alternative" is a national policy
provision that is applied by contractors when determining payment for all
durable medical equipment (DME). Contractors have the discretion to apply
this principle to payment for non-DME services as well. When strong clinical
justification exists, contractors may also develop LCDs that contain absolute
words such as "is never covered" or "is only covered for". When phrases with
absolute words are clearly stated in LCDs, contractors are not required to
make any exceptions or give individual consideration based on evidence.
Contractors create edits/parameters that are as specific and narrow as
possible to separate cases that can be automatically denied from those
requiring individual review.
Acceptance by individual health care providers, or even a limited group of
health care providers, normally does not indicate general acceptance by the
medical community. Testimonials indicating such limited acceptance, and
limited case studies distributed by sponsors with financial interest in the
outcome, are not sufficient evidence of general acceptance by the medical
community. LCDs that challenge the standard of practice in a community and
specify that an item is never 'reasonable and necessary', should be based on
sufficient evidence to convincingly refute evidence presented in support of
coverage. Less stringent evidence is needed when allowing for individual
consideration or when the used criterion is the least costly alternative.
The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of
2003 (MMA), section 731, requires the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid
Services (CMS) to develop a plan to evaluate new LCDs to decide which local
decisions should be adopted nationally. CMS currently has policies in place
that address the MMA requirements to promote greater consistency among
LCDs, require Medicare contractors within an area to consult on new local
coverage policies, and to disseminate information on LCDs among Medicare
contractors.
When assessing whether an LCD topic should be referred to the 731 Advisory
Group for NCD consideration, contractors consider the following criteria:
* Net impact on clinical health outcomes;
* Current and projected local utilization patterns outside of
perceived reasonable and necessary boundaries;
Current and projected national utilization patterns outside of
perceived reasonable and necessary boundaries;
* Unit cost;
* Collateral costs;
Associated quality and access to care issues including capacity of
health system to use technology safely; and
* Medicare payment error rate impact.
The Carrier Advisory Committee (CAC)vi
Carriers usually establish one CAC per state. Where there is more than one
carrier in a state, the carriers jointly establish a CAC. If there is one carrier for
many states, each state has a full committee and the opportunity to discuss
draft LCDs and issues presented in their state. Carriers that develop identical
policies for their entire jurisdiction may sometimes establish a single CAC. A
contractor with LCD jurisdiction for two or more states is strongly
encouraged to develop uniform LCDs across all its jurisdictions.
The purpose of the CAC is to provide:
A formal mechanism for physicians in the state to be informed of
and participate in the development of an LCD in an advisory
capacity;
e A mechanism to discuss and improve administrative policies
that are within carrier discretion; and
e A forum for information exchange between carriers and
physicians.
While the CAC reviews all draft LCDs, the final implementation decision about
LCDs rests with the Contractor Medical Director (CMD).
The CAC is to be composed of physicians, a beneficiary representative, and
representatives of other medical organizations. CAC members serve to
improve the relations and communication between Medicare and the
physician community. Specifically, they:
Disseminate proposed LCDs to colleagues in their respective
state and specialty societies to solicit comments;
- Disseminate information about the Medicare program obtained
at CAC meetings to their respective state and specialty societies;
and
e Discuss inconsistent or conflicting policies.
Each specialty has one member and a designated alternate with approval of
committee co-chairs. Additional members sometimes attend when policies
that require their expertise are under discussion. The CAC is co-chaired by
the CMD and one physician selected by the committee. Co-chairs present all
proposed LCDs to the CAC for discussion. The CAC holds a minimum of 3
meetings a year, with no more than 4 months between meetings. Each
meeting should include a discussion and presentation of comparative
utilization data that has undergone preliminary analysis by the carrier and
relates to discussion of the proposed LCD. Carriers solicit input from CAC
members to help explain or interpret the data and give advice on how
overutilization should be addressed. Sometimes the Committee uses data to
illustrate the extent of problem billing (e.g., average number of services per
100 patients) to help justify the need for a particular policy. Participation in
the CAC is considered a service to physician colleagues. Carriers do not
provide an honorarium or other forms of compensation to members.
Expenses are the responsibility of the individuals or the associations they
represent.
The LCD process and some factors that may influence it
Local Coverage Determination Time Frames'
Unlike the NCD time clock that begins with the acceptance of a formal request
to open an NCD, the time clock for an LCD begins with the initiation of a
minimum 45-day comment period following publication of a draft LCD.
During this time, comments on the draft LCD must be solicited from several
outside parties, including affected health professionals, other contractors,
r - - - -- -- -- - - - - - - --
providers, and QIOs. In addition to the draft LCD comment period, contractors
provide open meetings for the purpose of discussing draft LCDs prior to
presenting the policy to the Contractor Advisory Committee (CAC). Once the
contractor has considered all the comments and developed the final LCD, it
must be published on Medicare's coverage website. A minimum notice period
of 45 days is required prior to the effective date of implementation.
Principal differences between NCDs and LCDs
NCD LCD




Binding to QIOs, QICs, ALJs, MAC JurisdictionPSCs and Medicare
Appeals Council
Not binding to Medicare Part D plans ALs
Process initiated Both Internally, by the
internally or externally MACs
Process open to the Yes Yespublic?
45 days after draft
9-12 months after LCD is issued and 45
Time to complete NCD is accepted, days of notice periodbefore it is effective.
Total process takes
about 4 months
CMS Staff Review and Medical literature,
Base of decision sometimes TAs and CMS, other
MEDCACs contractors and CACs
Contains applicable No Yes
codes?
Conditions and More general More restrictive
limitations
Number of policies
currently in effect 314 More than 5'000publicated in CMS
website
Private payers coverage decisions
The private US health care system works mainly through employer-based
insurance contracted either through traditional indemnity insurance or
Managed Care Organizations (MCOs). Managed Care refers to a constellation
of networks, payment policies, utilization review and other functions
wrapped around the traditional insurance function whose goal is to
rationalize the care received and reduce its cost. Managed Care Organizations
include:
Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs), which manage
health plans with a closed network of physicians outside of
which care is not reimbursed.
* Point of Service (POS) health plans, which is the same as an HMO
but with the option to go out of network with substantial
additional coverage.
Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs), which manage health
plans that contract with a network of "preferred" physicians but
also offers reduced coverage outside of that network.
Most of the private health in the US is provided by MCOs either directly or
because insurers subcontract their services with an MCO. There are hundreds
of Managed Care Organizations in the United States and each has different
structures and procedures for making coverage decisions. For a technology to
be eligible for reimbursement by a Managed Care Organization, usually the
technology must not be excluded by the language of the health insurance
contract between the MCO and insurers, who are the payers at the end. This
generally means that the technology must contribute to provision of one of
the broad categories of services specified as being covered (hospital services,
physician office visits, durable medical equipment), must be "medically
necessary" under the particular circumstances of the case, and must not be
"experimental" or "investigational". In addition, many contracts exclude or
limit coverage for various more-or-less specific services. The contractual
framework is typically determined through negotiations between purchasers
(employers) and MCOs. Within this framework, MCO personnel, such as a
medical director and utilization review staff, interpret contracts to make
decisions about coverage and payment for emerging technologiesvii.
Sometimes an MCO undertakes a formal process to determine whether a
technology should be covered under any circumstance. Such decisions can
require judgments about whether the technology pertains to a covered
benefit or is investigational, or about the conditions under which its use is
safe and effective. Many of these issues can be informed by a Technology
Assessment (TA), which is a somewhat structured effort to judge the clinical
effectiveness and sometimes the cost-effectiveness of medical technologies,
similar to Medicare TAs. It usually involves critical evaluation and synthesis
of evidence available from clinical studies and other systematic evidence;
often, expert opinion is incorporated. On top of peer-reviewed journals, local
academics and physicians leaders, MCOs often obtain assessments from
public and private organizations like the Health Care Financing
Administration (HCFA), the Agency of Healthcare Research and Quality
(AHRQ), the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the Emergency Care Research
Institute (ECRI), Hayes Inc. and the Blue Cross, Blue Shield Technology
Institute for Health Care Management Research and Educational Foundation.
If medical directors, committees, or other staff determines that a technology
is covered, patient-selection criteria are often developed. These criteria
specify the circumstances under which use of the technology is viewed as
medically necessary. On medical necessity determinations sometimes it is
difficult to distinguish between medical factors such as mortality, and non-
medical factors, like quality of life and conveniencevii.
Formal TAs are typically performed by large payers, which usually have
several affiliated health plans operating in various locations; however, a
positive coverage decision by one of these large MCOs does not guarantee
coverage by its affiliated plans. Formal coverage decisions may not be crucial
to how extensively a new technology is used. Sometimes new technologies
are reimbursed without MCO personnel even being aware of that fact, usually
because it is being used by a plan's providers and billed under a pre-existing
Current Procedural Terminology (CPT) code, so that the bill is paid without
anyone within the MCO being aware that a new technology is involvedvii.
A positive decision on coverage does not mean that every enrollee has access
to the procedure; MCOs have processes for determining whether the
procedure is medically necessary in particular cases. These processes are
performed at a local level, even if coverage decisions are made nationally.
MCOs that provide care through contracts with capitated medical groups may
delegate medical-necessity decisions to them. This is because capitated
medical groups bear the financial risk by accepting a flat fee to provide
covered benefits to a specific group of individualsvii.
MCOs generally lack systematic surveillance mechanisms for new
technologies. They tend to react to triggers such as physician and patient
demand, prior-authorization requests and claims submitted without a CPT
code. MCOs also base their coverage decisions on their competitor's decisions.
When several of their physicians report receiving payment from one of their
competitors, an MCO is likely to assess whether it should cover the procedure.
The importance of MCOs has grown in the last two decades due to concerns of
increased cost. MCOs have different degrees to which they -or their
providers- bear the financial risk for use of some procedures or medical
technologiesvii.
MCOs also consider nonmedical factors in making coverage decisions,
includingvii:
* State insurance mandates and other state regulatory
requirements
* Publicity about and controversy surrounding a procedure or
medical device
* Demand for a technology among patients and physicians
* Potential for litigation
Denials of coverage can be difficult in cases of life-threatening illnesses in
which patients have the right to appeal for denial of coverage. Typically,
indemnity insurers are more willing to cover some procedures and in many
cases, they reimburse more generouslyvii.
I. Hypothesis
The hypothesis of the present research is that disparities between local and
national coverage policies are influenced in a statistically significant manner
at the state level by the following variables:
- Number of Schools of Medicine;
- Number of physicians;
e Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita by state, which is the
state's economic output divided by its number of inhabitants
(also called Gross State Product per capita);
- State Ranking according to number of Level 1 and Level 2
Trauma Centers + Population density per square mile;
e MEDCAC member's characteristics.
We would expect the correlations to be as follows:
Negatively Correlated Variables:
* Number of Schools of Medicine and number of physicians:
Because LCDs are usually more restrictive than NCDs, and don't
contradict them, an LCD tends to restrict physician's ability to use
new tools and therefore would be against their interests. The
more medical schools there are, the more active physicians there
would be to advocate for their interests, which would be
reflected in less discrepancies between LCDs and NCDs and less
LCD issuing activity.
e GDP per capita per state. In a similar way, a higher GDP per
capita is expected to be correlated with a more inclusive
coverage policy, which would be reflected in less discrepancy
between LCDs and NCDs and less LCDs issued. The reasoning
here is that greater purchasing power usually leads to higher
consumption levels for health care services.
* State Ranking according to number of Level 1 and Level 2
Trauma Centers, adjusted for population density. A better
ranking in number of Level 1 and Level 2 Trauma Centers (which
means a lower number in the ranking) is also expected to be
correlated with a more inclusive coverage -policy (less
discrepancy between LCDs and NCDs and less issued LCDs),
because more sophisticated Medical Centers have a wider
offering of health services and advocate for their reimbursement.
Finally, for procedures that require a MEDCAC to make a decision, it is
expected that the MEDCAC composition will influence the number and
characteristics of issued LCDs, according to the MEDCAC's member's profile.
III. Research methods
Data
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) have a
Medicare Coverage Database accessible by the Internet at
http://www.cms.gov/mcd. Using the Advanced Search option, I found 314
matches for National Coverage Decisions (NCDs) that are currently in effect.
From those, I narrowed my search to all NCDs currently in effect in the
following benefit categories, which I think are the most important areas in
terms of market size for development of health technologies:
* Inpatient Hospital Services
* Durable Medical Devices
* Diagnostic Laboratory Tests
* Physician's Services
* Diagnostic Tests (other)
The previous search narrowed the NCDs to 193 matches. On these matches, I
gathered the following information to assemble a database for this research
purposes:
- National Coverage Determination (NCD) section
- NCD title
- Implementation date
- National Decision (Covered=1 or Not Covered=O)
- National Coverage Limitations
- Technology Assessment (TA) (0=no TA to make decision, 1=TA)
- MEDCAC (0= no MEDCAC required, 1=MEDCAC required)





- MAC Part A=Medicare Administrative Contractor Part A
- MAC Part B=Medicare Administrative Contractor Part B
- DME MAC= Durable Medical Equipment Medicare
Administrative Contractor
- RHHI= Regional Home Health and Hospice Intermediary
- State where LCD is applicable
- Effective date of LCD
- Local Coverage Decision (0=Not covered, 1=Covered)
- Local Coverage limitations
- Difference of Coverage Limitations between NCD and LCD
(0=Different, 1= the same)
- Difference of Coverage Limitations between different states (0=at
least one state has a different policy, 1=all states have the same
policy)
- Base of Decision (Journals, CMS, specific sources, etc)
After the previous information was obtained (see Tables 1 to 5), I computed
for each state the number of times that LCD Coverage Limitations coincided
with their NCD counterparts, the number of times that they were different
and the total number of times that a state issued an LCD (see Table 6). For
this research purposes, different Coverage Limitations between LCDs and
NCDs means there is at least one different criterion for coverage.
As shown in Table 7, I collected the following data for each state from their
indicated sources:
- Number of Schools of Medicine, from the Association of American
Medical Colleges (AAMC)
- Number of physician's, from the United States Department of Labor,
Occupational Employment Statistics, May 2009. It doesn't include
self-employed doctors.
- Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita by state, from the US
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2008
- Number of Level 1 and Level 2 Trauma Centers, from DataMasher
(www.datamasher.org)
- Population density per square mile, from DataMasher
(www.datamasher.org)
- Number of Level 1 and Level 2 Trauma Centers + Population density
per square mile, from DataMasher (www.datamasher.org)
- State Ranking according to Number of Level 1 and Level 2 Trauma
Centers + Population density per square mile, from DataMasher
(www.datamasher.org)
Once I assembled the database I used the Excel LINEST, LOGEST and
PEARSON functions to find possible linear or exponential correlation models
and the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient between various
pairs of variables for each State. The pairs of variables I analyzed were:
- Number of times an LCD differed from an NCD versus:
- Number of schools of medicine
- Number of physicians
- GDP per capita
- Ranking according to number of Level 1 and 2 Trauma Centers
adjusted for population density
- Number of times an LCD was the same as an NCD versus:
- Number of schools of medicine
- Number of physicians
- GDP per capita
- Ranking according to number of Level 1 and 2 Trauma Centers
adjusted for population density
- Total number of times an LCD was issued versus:
- Number of schools of medicine
- Number of physicians
- GDP per capita
- Ranking according to number of Level 1 and 2 Trauma Centers
adjusted for population density
I quantified the number of times an LCD was the same as an NCD because it is
not exactly the difference between the total LCDs and the number of times an
LCD differed from NCDs, since for some procedures the difference couldn't be
determined due to lack of information. On the other hand, although the total
number of times an LCD was issued was expected to be highly correlated with
the number of times an LCD differed from an NCD, I measured its correlation
with the chosen variables separately because it may not always be the case.
To analyze the MEDCAC members characteristics, first I downloaded the
members list from the CMS website at
https://www.cms.gov/FACA/02 MedCAC.asp, under the archive "Roster"
(updated 05/05/2010). The list includes name, academic grades, occupation
and organization affiliation. I gathered the following information from various
Internet public sources:
- Specialty
- Age (In some cases, it was available at www.healthgrades.com or it
was approximated when the number of years since graduation was
provided)
- State where the organization to which the member is affiliated is
located
- Sex
From the MEDCAC database I obtained the Committee profile, according to
the members characteristics.
In order to test my conclusions further and to understand more the local and
national coverage determination processes and other possible factors that
influence them, I interviewed four Contractor Medical Directors (CMDs), who
are the key players in the LCD process. The interview questions and
responses can be found in Appendix A.
Limitations of the approach
The present research is focused on discrepancies between NCDs and LCDs. It
doesn't analyze discrepancies between LCDs. As most of the currently issued
policies are LCDs, this research approach fails to assess most of the
discrepancies at the local level. However, with the Medicare contractor's
consolidation taking place in the last seven years as part of the Medicare
Contracting Reform, national policies are gaining importance as means to
homogenize the current disparities in coverage. Analyzing discrepancies
between local policies, although an interesting exercise, would give a picture
of the past state of affairs of coverage policies, instead of the expected future
trends.
A second limitation of the present approach is its focus on Medicare coverage
policies. The other big player in coverage policies is the private insurance
sector. But due to the difficulty in collecting information from the private
sector, as well as the chosen limits for this research, the present research
study is limited in that regard to the public sector. However, because
Medicare coverage policies influence to a great extent coverage decisions of
private payers, the present approach is of great importance to understand the
system as a whole. Also, private payers are generally happy to rely on
Medicare coverage guidelines in developing their own.
Data limitations and challenges
The data necessary for this research were easily accessible from public
sources in the Internet, mainly from the CMS website. However, detecting the
differences between NCDs and LCDs coverage limitations posed a greater
challenge for assembling the database. It meant reading the different national
and local policies for 193 procedures, which was very time-consuming and
required a lot of concentration and sometimes a subjective judgment to
decide if the difference was real or only in terms of the language used. If at
least one coverage criterion or condition was different or additional (usually
in the LCD), I defined it as different.
IV. Results
I analyzed a total of 193 procedures with NCDs currently in effect. From
these, 137 (71%) received a positive decision, while 56 (29%) denied
coverage. Only two procedures, Nesiritide for Treatment of Heart Failure
Patients and Lymphocyte Mitogen Response Assays, had a clear difference
between the NCD and LCDs. The first procedure was not covered under the
NCD while it was covered by the LCDs. For the Mitogen Response Assays the
difference in coverage policies was the opposite: covered according to the
NCD and not covered by the LCDs. For all other procedures the difference was
in the coverage policy and limitations. Usually, LCDs are more specific in their
criteria and have more limitations than NCDs. However, having different
policies and coverage limitations between NCDs and LCDs doesn't necessarily
mean they contradict each other.
From the 193 analyzed procedures, only 69 had issued LCDs, leaving the
majority of procedures (nearly two thirds) with a homogeneous coverage
policy dictated by the NCD. From the total LCDs issued for these 69
procedures, 51% differ in one way or another from the corresponding NCD,
while 46% of the LCDs were exactly the same as the NCD (for 3% of the LCDs,
the difference from the NCD couldn't be assessed due to lack of information).
From the 193 procedures, only 10 required Technology Assessments and
only 12 required MEDCACs as support to make the decision.
The procedures that required Technology Assessments are:
- Acupuncture for fibromyalgia (not covered, no LCD)
- Acupuncture for osteoarthritis (not covered, no LCD)
- Vertebral Artery Surgery (covered, no LCD)
- Fecal Occult Blood Test (covered, LCDs different from NCD)
- Assessing Patient's Suitability for Electrical Nerve Stimulation
Therapy (covered, no LCD)
- Hyperbaric Oxygen Therapy (covered, LCDs different from NCD)
- Magnetic Resonance Spectroscopy (not covered, LCDs same as NCD)
- Ambulatory Blood Pressure Monitoring (covered, no LCD)
- Computed Tomography (covered, LCDs different from NCD)
The procedures that required a MEDCAC are:
- Bariatric Surgery for Treatment of Morbid Obesity (covered, LCDs
different from NCD)
- Percutaneous Transluminal Angioplasty (PTA) (covered, LCDs
different from NCD)
- Stem Cell Transplantation (covered, LCDs different from NCD)
- Transmyocardial Revascularization (TMR) (covered, LCD same as
NCD)
- Continuous Positive Airway Pressure (CPAP) Therapy for
Obstructive Sleep Apnea (OSA) (covered, LCDs different from NCD)
- Home Blood Glucose Monitors (covered, LCDs different from NCD)
- Noncontact Normothermic Wound Therapy (NNWT) (not covered,
LCD different from NCD)
- Electrical Stimulation (ES) and Electromagnetic Therapy for the
Treatment of Wounds (covered, LCDs different from NCD)
- Ocular Photodynamic Therapy (OPT) (covered, LCD same as NCD)
- Ambulatory Blood Pressure Monitoring (covered, no LCD, also
required a TA)
- Positron Emission Tomography (FDG) for Oncologic Conditions
(covered, LCD same as NCD)
- Positron Emission Tomography (PET) Scans (under review)
The benefit category with most issued NCDs and LCDs is physician's services,
while the benefit category with least issued NCDs and LCDs is laboratory
services.
As shown in Table 6, the states with most issued LCDs are (in descending
order): Virginia, West Virginia, Illinois, Wisconsin, Ohio, Michigan, Kentucky,
Indiana and Connecticut, mostly states from the East Coast and Great Lakes
region. The states with the least issued LCDs are (in ascending order): Idaho,
Alaska, Arizona, Oregon, Washington, Alabama, Georgia, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Tennessee, New Jersey, District of Columbia, Montana, North
Dakota, South Dakota, Utah and Wyoming.
The states with the higher number of differences between NCDs and LCDs are
(in descending order): Virginia, West Virginia, Ohio, Kentucky, Illinois,
Michigan, Kansas, Indiana, Connecticut and New York. The states with the
higher number of equal policies between NCDs and LCDs are (in descending
order): Virginia, Virgin Islands, Florida, Illinois, Michigan, North Carolina,
Wisconsin, West Virginia, Ohio, Kentucky, South Carolina, Indiana and
Connecticut.
Most states that are very active in producing LCDs also have a high number of
both, policies that differ from NCDs and policies that are the same as NCDs.
Kansas and New York are average states with respect to producing LCDs but
they have high rates of discrepancies between NCDs and LCDs. On the other
hand, Florida, the Virgin Islands, North Carolina and South Carolina are also
average states with respect to LCD issuing activity but most of their local
policies are equal to NCDs.
I also analyzed whether there is a pattern of association between the previous
LCDs results and Medicare Part A and Part B contractors. As shown in table
11, I only found a possible link between the states with the least issued LCDs
and their respective contractors. From 17 states, six (Arizona, Montana, North
Dakota, South Dakota, Utah and Wyoming) receive administrative service for
Medicare Part A and Part B by Noridian Administrative Services, while four
states (Idaho, Alaska, Oregon and Washington) are serviced by the National
Heritage Insurance Company. However, these two contractors also service
other states that don't have a low LCD activity. Based on this preliminary
analysis, LCD activity and discrepancies with NCDs don't appear to be related
to the jurisdiction or contractor to which the states belongs, but further
research would be needed to study a possible link.
The linear and exponential correlation models between the various pairs of
variables that I analyzed for each state didn't demonstrate any significant
relationship between any of these variables (see Table 8). For both the linear
and the exponential models, the coefficient of determination (rz), which is the
square of the correlation coefficient between the two variables, had a very
low value (less than 0.15), indicating a very poor description of the
correlation of the two variables with the models used. The Pearson product-
moment correlation coefficient is a measure of the strength of the linear
correlation between the two variables. It is obtained by dividing the
covariance of the two variables by the product of their standard deviations.
For all the pairs of variables analyzed, the Pearson product-moment
correlation coefficient had a very low value indicating a very weak correlation
between them.
Sub-analysis
To search further for possible correlation patterns, I narrowed my analysis to
representative states from three strategic geographical areas: the East Coast,
the Center and the West Coast. I performed the same statistical analysis for
the following states: Massachusetts, New York, Maryland, Georgia, Florida,
Illinois, Missouri, Texas, California, Oregon and Washington. The states and
regions for the sub-analysis were chosen based on their relevance in terms of
number of patients and health care industrial and regulation activity. There
wasn't any significant correlation between the same pair of variables for
these states (see Table 9).
To find possible disparities drivers between regions, I divided the previous















I performed the same statistical analysis between regions, taking average
values for each region, to correct for the difference in the number of states
from each one (see Table 9). I found that the number of Medical Schools and
the state's ranking according to the number of Level 1 and 2 Trauma Centers
(adjusted for population density) are positively correlated with the number
of LCDs that are different from NCDs, the number of LCDs that are the same as
NCDs and the total number of issued LCDs. As the number of Medical Schools
increases and the ranking is better (lower ranking number), the total number
of issued LCDs increases, including the ones that are different from NCDs and
the ones that are the same. These correlations are best explained by an
exponential model, with r2>0.94.
I also performed the same statistical analysis within each region, to see if
there were any significant correlations between the same variables when
comparing states of the same region (see table 9). In the East Coast, I didn't
find any significant correlation. In the Central US, there was a correlation
between the state's ranking according to the number of Level 1 and 2 Trauma
Centers (adjusted for population density) and the number of LCDs differ from
NCDs and the total number of issued LCDs. The better the ranking (lower
ranking number), the greater the number of LCDs which differed from NCDs,
and the more LCDs were issued. These correlations were very well explained
by both linear and exponential models, with r2 >0.95. Finally, in the West
Coast, I found that the number of Schools of Medicine and the number of
physicians are positively correlated with the number of LCDs that are
different from NCDs and the total number of issued LCDs. As the number of
Schools of Medicine and physicians increases, LCDs that are different from
NCDs and total issued NCDs also increase. Both correlations were very well
explained by linear and exponential models, with r2>0.99.
MEDCAC Members Analysis
The MEDCAC analysis shows the following characteristics of its current
members, shown in Table 10:
Professional profile. 69% of the members hold Medical Doctor (MD) degrees,
20% have a PhD, 11% a Master of Science, 11% a Master of Public Health and
10% hold a Master of Business Administrations (MBA). There are only 4
Registered Nurses in the Committee and 3 members with a JD degree. With
the exception of one MD member that is a general practitioner, all the other
MDs are specialists. The main specialties are, in descending order:
- Internal medicine (12 members)
- Cardiology (7)
- Pathology (4)
- Anesthesiology, emergency medicine, orthopedic surgery, geriatrics,
surgery, neurology, ophthalmology, pharmacology, family medicine,
epidemiology, gastroenterology and immunology (3 members each).
The following specialties are not represented in the Committee:
- Obstetrics/Gynecology







Although for each MEDCAC meeting 15 additional members (which can
be non-MEDCAC members) are selected with knowledge specific to the
topic in question to provide additional input, the absence of permanent
members that represent very important specialties such as
obstetrics/gynecology, dermatology, pediatrics and pulmonology is
very notable.
Age profile. I could obtain or approximate the age for 1/3 of the members,
with an average age of 53 years.
Sex profile. 67% of members are men.
Geographical profile. The data shows the prominence of some states on which
most of the members work. In descending order, these are: Illinois,
Massachusetts, New York, California, Pennsylvania, Michigan, New Jersey,
Connecticut, 'Florida, Washington, Ohio, Georgia, District of Columbia,
Maryland and Minnesota. The data shows most members are concentrated in
the East Coast and the Great Lakes area.
Academics vs non-academics. 78% of members are academics while 22% are
non-academics.
Academia versus industry. 59% of the members work in academic institutions,
while 41% work in industry.
Patient advocates and industry representatives. There are 6 members
representing patient advocate organizations and 6 members representing
industry, of which two are from Pfizer.
Contractor Medical Directors (CMDs) Interviews
The following is a summary of the main opinions shared by most of the CMDs
interviewed:
There is not a direct correlation between the time frames for issuing
NCDs and LCDs. Some LCDs are issued without any NCD preceding them and
later an NCD is issued for the procedure, after many LCDs have made clear the
necessity for an NCD. Sometimes NCDs are issued without any LCD previously
in place and LCDs come later to adapt it to the specific coverage
circumstances of the contractor. The main reason to issue an LCD after an
NCD is already in place is to specify the billing codes that apply according to
the contractor's criteria. NCDs don't specify billing codes, because CMS
doesn't have the human and economic resources necessary to do it.
Consistency between LCDs from different contractors is required only
for the four DME contractors (due to their limited number it is relatively easy
for them to agree on coverage policies). For other benefit categories,
consistency is harder to achieve. One CMD mentioned that the original idea of
CMS wasn't to achieve consistency between different contractors but to let
them adapt policies to the local standards of medical practice. But today, with
evidence-based medicine, there is no reason to have variation between
medical practice across states, so LCDs should be consistent across
contractors.
CMDs made very clear that LCDs shouldn't contradict NCDs. However,
they recognize that LCDs present differences from NCDs, mainly in the form
of exclusions not specified in NCDs. These exclusions are specified through
billing codes applicable for LCDs. CMS intentionally leaves these exclusion
decisions open to the contractor's discretion. These exclusions are supposed
to be adaptations of the NCD to local circumstances, like detected local
aberrant billing patterns and local standards of medical practice. Using the
exclusions specified in LCDs streamline the denial of claims, decreasing the
need for assessing claims one by one, which is more costly for contractors
than issuing an LCD.
The following were mentioned as drivers of LCD issuing activity:
* The necessity to automate legitimate denials
* A history of abuse and fraud for the procedure or in the
geographical area
* The CMD's special interests according to his/her specialty
* Human and economic resources available to issue LCDs
* When there are new procedures, to make clear coverage
conditions
* Contractor's philosophy towards coverage policies. Some
contractors prefer to leave coverage decisions in the hands of
physicians, while others have a different approach to coverage
decisions.
* How clear is the NCD. If it is sufficiently clear, contractors have
less need to issue an LCD.
Perceived need for an LCD, which can depend on the population
density and the number of Trauma Centers, physicians and
Schools of Medicine.
* Ambition and experience of the CMD. More experienced CMDs
issue more LCDs
* Data analysis of medical necessity criteria based on:
- Quality of care
- History of claim's billing errors
- Billing abuse
- Historical problematic areas
- Comparison of utilization patterns between states
The decision to issue an LCD rests in the CMD. Although the CAC has
only an advisory role, its composition and level of activity and expertise of its
members influence the LCD process. Usually, CAC members are proposed by
the local medical associations. CACs meet approximately every four months,
reviewing 6 to 8 LCDs in two hours, with approximately 30 physicians from
the specialties impacted by the particular LCDs discussed in each meeting.
Each LCD takes about 90 days to complete. According to one CMD, because
joining a CAC is not compensated or reimbursed, it requires time and often
money from the physicians, making it difficult to recruit opinion leaders. For
this and other reasons, CMDs without enough staff or efficient CACs often
copy other contractor's LCDs. In the future most CMDs interviewed think
contractors will end up with one CAC per jurisdiction.
The CMDs prioritize LCDs to issue according to the following criteria:
- Data analysis of medical review;
* New technologies that might pose a risk to the Medicare funds;
- Procedures with perceived overutilization;
* Procedures where there is concern for abuse;
- The number and type of claims received;
* Procedures that are expensive or very highly used;
e Procedures that have a significant clinical value or that pose a
significant medical risk.
Situations can arise where there are LCDs issued for some, but not all
states in a jurisdiction because some of the LCDs have been issued by
different contractors before Medicare Contracting Reform. But once
contractor consolidation takes place, contractors should issue LCDs for all
states in their jurisdiction.
Medicare Contracting Reform will cause more homogeneous policies
between states due to the decreasing number of contractors, but there will
still be differences between states belonging to different contractors. There
will no longer be differences between Medicare Part A and Part B policies
because they will be issued by the same contractor.
When an LCD challenges the standard of practice, there is pressure
from the profession, industry and consumers to change it. If other contractors
cover the procedure, the pressure to change the LCD will be higher. This
political pressure can push the contractor to put the LCD on hold. However, if
the decision is based on clinical evidence from respected journals or expert
opinion, it will prevail.
The Least Costly Alternative (LCA) coverage criterion is not used
anymore even for DMEs due to a recent court decision (Hays vs. Sebelius) and
legal pressure from the medical device and pharmaceutical industries.
Most NCDs are not based on TAs or MEDCACs because they are costly
to CMS and because many NCDs are not issued for new technologies, which
are more prone to require TAs or MEDCACs. According to one CMD,
procedures that require medical devices (as opposed to drugs) are more
subject to NCDs where TAs or MEDCACs are used, since the FDA approval for
medical devices can be less stringent than that for drugs, and may assess the
safety of the device more than its clinical value. Thus, further clinical evidence
is needed to justify coverage, and this is usually based on TAs or MEDCACs.
This was confirmed by my analysis, which shows that of the 22 procedures
requiring TAs or MEDCACs, 14 involve medical devices.
A lot of policy activity is carried on at the local level because
contractors issue LCDs faster than CMS issues NCDs and because CMS doesn't
have the resources to make all policy decisions. However, the level of
expertise and structure of the evaluation mechanism are lower at the local
level. One CMD mentioned that the medical device and pharmaceutical
industries prefer to convince local contractors of the benefits of their
technologies at the local level instead of CMS, because it is easier in terms of
the evidence required and time invested. Once a contractor issues a policy in
favor of the procedure, other contractors are pressured to do the same.
V. Discussion of results
The present discussion of results is based on an analysis of 193 (61%)
procedures from 314 with NCDs currently in effect.
LCDs agree, with the exception of very few decisions (2 from 193), with NCDs
in the ultimate question they are trying to address: is the procedure covered?
However, a more meticulous analysis reveals that approximately half (51%)
of LCDs differ from NCDs in the conditions, circumstances and specific criteria
that set the limits of that coverage decision. The main difference between
NCDs and LCDs is in the form of exclusions specified in LCDs through
applicable billing codes that are not specified in NCDs. CMS intentionally
leaves these exclusion decisions open to the contractor's discretion to adapt
the NCDs to their local needs and because CMS doesn't have the resources
and speed to manage all this policy activity. States that don't issue LCDs have
to adhere to the respective NCD. 64% of procedures (124/193) that have an
NCD don't have any LCD at all. According to CMDs, this could mean that most
NCDs are sufficiently clear and don't require specific billing coding
information or that any of the other drivers of LCD issuing activity are usually
absent (aberrant billing patterns, new procedures, etc.). If we take into
account that from 193 procedures that have NCDs only 69 (36%) have at least
one LCD and that from these, 46% are exactly the same as their NCDs
counterparts (while 51% are different), only 18% (69/193 x 0.51) of
procedures have local policies that are to some extent different from the
national policies. This means there is a reasonable degree of homogeneity in
coverage policies (82%) across the United States for procedures for which an
NCD has been issued. However, most procedures have LCDs without an NCD
in place, in which case the differences in coverage policies depend on the
degree of variability between LCDs issued by different contractors.
Going through an NCD process is not necessarily bad from the perspective of
the medical technology advocates, since 71% of procedures received a
favorable national and local coverage decision. I expect this to be particularly
true when the NCD process is initiated by a company or individual with an
interest in a favorable coverage decision, since once they initiate the process
they are usually well prepared to present the evidence in favor of
reimbursement. However, future research is needed to find a possible
correlation between the identity of the initiator of an NCD process and its
outcome. This may be difficult, as gathering the information for such a
research is not available, to the best of my knowledge, from the CMS website.
That the National Coverage Decision process is somehow not very structured
is demonstrated by the fact that from 193 procedures that underwent
coverage decisions, only 10 required a Technology Assessment and only 12
required a Medicare Evidence Development & Coverage Advisory Committee
(MEDCAC). According to CMDs this is mainly because CMS has budget
constraints and limits the use of TAs and MEDCACs to new technologies that
require clear national coverage guidance, most of which are medical devices
due to. the lack of clinical effectiveness information in FDA device trials. None
of the 12 procedures requiring an evaluation from the MEDCAC involved a
specialty not represented in the MEDCAC, which could mean one of two
things: that the MEDCAC composition is adequate or that there aren't
procedures from these specialties evaluated by the MEDCAC precisely
because they are not represented in it. From the 22 decisions involving TAs or
MEDCACs, only 4 were not approved, which means that going through one of
these more structured processes is not necessarily bad for reimbursement
advocates. The reason for this might be that the basis for the evaluation is
clearer and known in advance, resulting in better preparation to present the
evidence from the parties interested in coverage. All other national decisions
were taken at the discretion of CMS authorities, many without information
disclosure of the criteria used to evaluate the clinical value of the procedure.
On the other hand, most LCDs mention the basis of their decision, which
usually are journals, CMS, external organizations or other carriers' decisions.
The states with a higher number of issued LCDs are mainly located in the East
Coast and the Great Lakes areas. It is interesting to note that the majority of
MEDCAC members are also concentrated in these two regions, although, to
the best of my knowledge, they are not supposed to be involved with Local
Coverage Determinations, so this would be a coincidental finding. Apart from
the analyzed variables thought to be related to LCD issuing activity in the
present study, these states might share common characteristics that could
reveal other possible variables that explain a greater LCD issuing activity and
in some cases more coverage discrepancies. As was explained in the Results
section, on a preliminary analysis, I hypothesized that contractors may be one
of these variables. However, I didn't find any indication of this. Future
research is needed to find possible predictors of LCD issuing activity based on
characteristics common to these states. One common characteristic shared by
these states is that they are home to many of the most influential medical
device, biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies. Some other possible
drivers mentioned by CMDs of such LCD issuing activity that could have local
variations and that merit further research, are:
* The necessity to automate legitimate denials
* A history of abuse and fraud
* CMD's experience, ambition and interests
e Human and economic resources available to the contractor to
issue LCDs
* Contractor's philosophy towards coverage policies
Perceived need for an LCD
e Level of sophistication of data analysis of utilization patterns,
quality of care and billing errors
Kansas and New York are of particular interest due to their large number of
discrepancies between LCDs and NCDs not explained by greater LCD issuing
activity. Since most of these discrepancies are exclusions not mentioned in
NCDs, some possible factors that merit further research are: a history of
abuse and fraud, a greater perceived need for an LCD, the CMD profile and a
greater data analysis capability in these states. On the other hand, Florida,
the Virgin Islands, North Carolina and South Carolina have a greater rate of
LCDs equal to NCDs. The same variables, pointing in the opposite direction,
can be responsible for these differences. Further research is needed to find
possible drivers of these coverage discrepancies and similarities.
On a national level, the present study shows that discrepancies between NCDs
and LCDs coverage limitations are not explained by the hypothesized factors.
However, some sub-analysis results showed some possible correlations when
comparing the same variables between regions and between states from the
same region. As I mentioned in the Results section above, the analysis
between regions showed that as the number of Medical Schools increases and
the ranking of Level 1 and 2 Trauma Centers (adjusted for population
density) is better (lower ranking number), the total number of issued LCDs
increases, including those that differ from NCDs as well as those that are the
same. This is contrary to hypothesis, since having more issued LCDs is not
supposed to be in favor of physician's and hospitals interests, if it is the case
that this excess LCD activity limits reimbursement for them. However, it could
be the case that this higher number of LCDs somehow favors physician's and
hospital's interests for these procedures.
In the statistical analysis within each region I found some interesting
correlations in the Central and West Coast regions, as mentioned in the
Results section. In the Central US I found that that with a better ranking of
Level 1 and 2 Trauma Centers (lower ranking number), more LCDs differed
from NCDs and more LCDs were issued. These results were unexpected
according to the initial hypothesis. Somehow hospital's interests in this
region have generated a greater LCD activity. In the West Coast, I found that
the number of Schools of Medicine and the number of physicians are
positively correlated with the number of LCDs that are different from NCDs
and the total number of issued LCDs. Again, this is the contrary of what was
initially expected: a lower policy discrepancy and a lower number of LCDs.
The correlations founded in the sub-analysis have to be taken with caution
and merit further research, since the number of states in the samples is too
small to arrive to a conclusion based on these data points.
Although few. analyzed procedures have required MEDCACs, an analysis of its
membership profile can be important if decisions are supposed to be more
structured in the future with the Medicare Contracting Reform. The typical
MEDCAC member is a 53 years old male MD with a specialty doing research
on an academic Institution located in the East Coast or the Great Lakes area.
Beyond this stereotype, the general composition of the MEDCAC is
comprehensive with respect to the different points of view and areas of
expertise required to evaluate the clinical value of medical procedures,
including industry representatives, patient advocates and experts in health
policy, health outcomes, epidemiology, biostatistics, pharmacology, nursing,
occupational, preventive and family medicine, public policy, law, psychology,
sociology and at least one representative of the most important medical
specialties, with the previously mentioned important exceptions. Although a
majority of members (59%) work in academic Institutions, there is an
important representation from the medical industry, private health systems
and health quality organizations. At the local level, on the other hand, CACs
fulfill only an advisory role and are not as influential as MEDCACs. CACs are
often composed of physicians who are not necessarily opinion leaders and
very often the evidence required to convince a CAC of the clinical value of a
procedure is lower than the evidence required to convince a MEDCAC.
VI. Conclusions and recommendations
The following conclusions and recommendations can be drawn from the
previous analysis and discussion of results:
o The majority of procedures (64%) that have an NCD don't have any
LCD at all. Further research is needed to determine the factors that
characterize the procedures for which LCDs are issued having an NCD
already in place. These could be any of the drivers of LCD issuing
activity discussed in the previous section.
o There is a reasonable degree of homogeneity in coverage policies (82%
are exactly the same) for procedures for which an NCD has been issued.
The degree of homogeneity or variability between LCDs from different
states is beyond the scope of this study and would be interesting to
explore in the future.
o The majority of differences between NCDs and LCDs come in the form
of conditions and diagnosis that are not excluded in the NCD, while
being excluded in the LCD, restricting coverage to certain CPT and
ICD-9 codes. CMS is clear that when an NCD mentions a covered
condition or diagnosis, it doesn't mean they should be the only ones
covered, it leaves that decision to the discretion of the contractors
through the LCDs. Thus, although LCDs don't openly contradict NCDs
(they never deny coverage for conditions specified in NCDs as covered,
except for the Mitogen Response Assays already mentioned), they use
the open space left by NCDs to restrict coverage according to their local
demands. According to CMDs, the reason why CMS leaves many
exclusion decisions open to contractor's discretion is because it doesn't
have the resources and speed to manage all this policy activity and
because CMS wants to let contractors adapt the NCDs to their local
needs. A future interesting research topic could be to explore whether
shifting this policy activity back to CMS, making exclusion decisions
and assigning billing codes directly in NCDs, could decrease coverage
policy variability, if this could be feasible from an operational and
administrative perspective and even if homogeneity in coverage
policies is desirable.
o The majority of the procedures (71%) that go through an NCD process
receive a positive coverage decision. The degree of limitations on this
positive coverage decision and its adequacy to standard medical
practice or clinical evidence is not assessed on this study and would be
an interesting question to ask in future coverage research.
o If the majority of procedures (82%) for which an NCD has been issued
have exactly the same coverage policies for all states and the majority
of NCDs are positive (in 71% of cases the procedure is covered), it
follows that, for the majority of procedures, reimbursement advocates -
including hospitals, physicians, industry and consumers- should pursue
NCDs instead of LCDs. On top of that, if LCDs are more restrictive than
NCDs, then, reimbursement advocates shouldn't be in favor of LCD
issuing activity. The only parties favored by LCD issuing activity are
clearly Medicare and to some extent its contractors, who, by
automating the denial of some claims, may decrease their operating
costs.
o In the majority of cases, the NCD process is left to the discretion of CMS
authorities, without any TA or MEDCAC involved in the decision
process. Some possible explanations for this are CMS budget
constraints or limiting the use of TAs or MEDCACs strictly to new
technologies, the majority of which are medical devices.
o Although MEDCACs are composed mostly of academic MD specialists,
the general composition of the MEDCAC is comprehensive with respect
to the different points of view and areas of expertise required to
evaluate the clinical value of medical procedures. On the other hand, at
the local level, CACs are often composed of physicians who are not
necessarily opinion leaders. In many cases, the evidence required to
convince a CAC of the clinical value of a procedure is lower than the
evidence required to convince a MEDCAC. That's one of the reasons
why many medical device manufacturers and pharmaceutical
companies prefer the local route to gain coverage for their products.
Other reasons are that LCDs take less time than NCDs to complete and
once a contractor accepts coverage of a procedure, it is easier to
convince other contractors.
o From a public policy perspective, clearer rules on coverage decisions at
the national level (meaning increased use of TAs or MEDCACs) would
incentivize industry leaders to pursue the national route for coverage
and this might attract more investment towards cost-effective medical
innovations, as reimbursement risk decreases.
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o The states with a higher degree of LCD issuing activity are located in
the East Coast and the Great Lakes areas. These states might share
common characteristics that account for this greater LCD issuing
activity and that merit further research, including: the necessity to
automate legitimate denials; a history of abuse and fraud; CMD's
experience, ambition and interests; budget size for issuing LCDs;
contractor's philosophy towards coverage policies; perceived need for
an LCD and level of sophistication of data analysis of utilization
patterns, quality of care and billing errors.
o Two states, Kansas and New York, have a higher rate of discrepancy
not explained by an increase in LCD issuing activity, while four states,
Florida, the Virgin Islands, North Carolina and South Carolina, have a
lower rate of discrepancies not explained by a lower LCD issuing
activity. Some possible drivers of this higher or lower rate of
discrepancies that need to be studied in the future could be: history of
abuse and fraud, perceived need for an LCD, the CMD profile and data
analysis capability.
o On a national level, discrepancies between NCDs and LCDs are not
explained by the hypothesized factors: number of Schools of
Medicine, number of physicians, GDP per capita, State Ranking
according to number of Level 1 and Level 2 Trauma Centers,
population density per square mile and MEDCAC members
characteristics.
o A sub-analysis between regions showed a significant positive
correlation (r2>0.94) between the number of issued LCDs and the
number of Schools of Medicine and between the number of issued LCDs
and the ranking of Level 1 and Level 2 Trauma Centers. Having a
greater LCD issuing activity could favor physicians' and hospitals'
interests.
o A sub-analysis between states of the same region showed that in the
Central US, a better ranking according to Level 1 and 2 Trauma Centers
is correlated (r2>0.95) with a higher LCD issuing activity and a greater
degree of differences between LCDs and NCDs. Having more
sophisticated hospitals could be a driver of LCD issuing activity and
greater differences between LCDs and NCDs. In the West Coast, the
number of Schools of Medicine and the number of physicians are
positively correlated (r2>0.99) with the total number of LCDs and the
number of LCDs that differ from NCDs, showing again that physician's
interests could be a driver of LCD issuing activity and of differences
between LCDs and NCDs.
o The correlations shown by the performed sub-analysis within regions
may imply that more LCDs are issued to restrict coverage when there is
a local need to control the excessive demand partially driven by the
higher number of hospitals and physicians that are active in pursuing
their interests. The fact that these correlations were shown only at a
regional level may indicate that when local factors are disregarded, the
original hypothesized factors do influence LCD activity, however, at a
national level, other hypothetical local factors may have a greater
influence on LCD activity and policy discrepancies. The higher LCD
issuing activity in the East Coast and Great Lakes areas confirm the
geographical nature of these other hypothetical factors.
o Medicare Contracting Reform will cause more homogeneous policies
between states but there will still be differences between states
belonging to different contractors. After Contracting Reform, there will
no longer be differences between Part A and Part B policies.
VII. Tables
Table 1. Inpatient Hospital Services
NCD LCD
Uniitatos Umitationa
Caovered (DeN. M EDOAC Ceratreotae difOmie? to dkiBeto of
NCD tide TA (0-N, I -Y Contracto States Covered? NLC oe Ds?1V(B={d d rY) Type (Oeinerent.
1-same) 1.86m)
A.ae fo the eatme t of tatecatter 0 Firt Coast Ser MAC Part A erd Ford
Ai anasoaA A uerto0o. C0
Acupuncteor fbroryalgio . 1. .
Acapunctoe tor steorthnb 1 0
Adult liver tnsplatation 05
.Aestheosa an oiac Paeralrgev 1 0 0
Artroscopic Lavaege and Artroopic Deb.e.ment tor the
Ostoarthtic Knee 1 0
Barietric Surgery for Treatment of Morbid Obsaity 1 0 1 Wisconsin Phys MAC Part A owa. Kansas, 1 1 1 CMS
Palmetto GBA MAC Part B California North 1 1 1 CMS
Nationa Govern F/Carrieo/MAC idincana.Inoi 1 1 1 CMS
CIGNA GovemrnCrer North Carolina. 1 0 0 Jourats
Blood Brain Barrier Osmotic Disrupion for Treatment of Bran
Tumors (Eflective March 20, 2007) 0
Bloodiateletransjuions 1 0
Blood Transfusions 1 . 0
CoaaPaemakers 1 0 0
Closed-Loop Blood Glucose Control Device (CBGCD 1 0 0
Ctyosurgery of Prostate 1 0 0 I-ist Coast Goto MAC Part A +Ihnda. Puto 1 1 0 1 Joumals
Dent: Examdnation Prior to Kidney Transplantation 1 0 0
Extracrn-al-itraranalo (EC-tC) Artieal Bypass surgery 0 0 0
Grarnuocyte Iranstusions 1 B D
Heart Transplns 1 0 0
Inpatient Hospital Pa-n Rehathtation Programs 1 B 0
Inpatent Hoepitl Stays for Treatment of Acoholism 1 0 0
Intestal and Muii-VirIeral rnsplantaon 1 0 0
Intestinal Bypass Surgery 0 0 0
Itraoperettrvent Iscularmapping 1 0 5
Invasive Intracranial Pressure Monitoing 1 0 0
inlet Cel Transplatation in tie Context of a Clin"ca Trin 1 0 0
Lraasopx:cCholecystetony 1 0 0
L-Dopa 1 1 0trnbar Artifial Disc Relacemert Lali 0 0 0 Nordian AdmirW Caner MAC PaAlaska. Oregon, 5 0 1 Technology Ass
Lang Volueto Reduction Surgery (Reduction Pneumoplasty) 1 0 D First Coast SerN MAC Part A Flonda. Puerto 1 1 1 CMS
Nesantide for Tetment of HearI Faiure Patients 0 0 0 First Coas Serv MAC Part A. Mt orida. Puerto f 1 0 0 Jornls
Nations! Govemr Fl, Carner, MAC Indiana, Crn, t 0 5 Joumnals
Palmetto GBA MAC Part A Caleforria mer 1 0 5 Journas
Nonseletive (Random) Transusions and Lving Related Donor
Spenct Transkusions (DST} in Kidney Transplantation
P1s 0Pancreas Trensptlants 1 0 0
Pediatori Jer TansDoantation 1 0 5
Pareotanenus ttage-led Btos BIopsy
Percutaneous Transiumina Angioplasty (PTA) 1 1 Palmetto GBA Carrie Oho. West Wrg 1 Jeals
POstua' Drainage Proceduras nd Pulmoray.Eaeas 1 0 0
Stem Celrmnsplanta tion . 1 Nationa Goverttl Center MAC Indtanalios 1 0Jsoumals
Stereotactic Cingulotomy as a Means or Psydosurgey C 0 I
Thoracc Duct Drainage IDDy in RenalIranoplents 1 D 0
Transcutaneous lectrical Nerve Stemulatr (tiNS tot Ac- ie Post- CIGNA Goveree DME MAC Alabama. Arkan 1 0 1 NA
Operative Pain 1 0 D
N .. an Adrn DME MAC Aas. Arne 0 1 NA
.I-.C C.. .r DME MAC Connecticut. D t D.1 NA
Natienaz Goven DME MAC lolnis, rder.. 1 . 1 NA
T....r..yn..er....e. ...........a ....t..n .M 1.............. FirsPo t Coast Sara MAC Port B 'Florida. Purto. f oar
Ultraftrar .tionemoperfus.on and. Hemo.r..o.n 1 0 C
Ultrasourd Dignostie Procedures . 0 0
Vertebra Artery swr Y
Table 2. Durable Medical Equipment
NCD LCD
Limitations Limitations
NCD title er N TA (=N 1=Y) MEDCAC Contractor Covered? different to different to Base ofNCDtteT(=,=)Contractor States Coee? NCD? other LCDs? eiI=Y) (0=N, 1=Y) Type (0=different, (O=different, Decision
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Continuous Positive airway Pressure
(CPAP) Therapy for Obstructive
Sleep Apnea (OSA)
0 1 Noridian Admini DME MAC Alaska, America 1 0 1 NA
CIGNA Governn DME MAC Alabama Arkan 1 0 1 NA
NHIC Corp DME MAC Connecticut, Dir 1 0 1 NA
National Govern DME MAC Illinois, Indiana, 1 0 1 NA
Home Blood Glucose Monitors 1 0 1 Noridlan Admini DME MAC Alaska, America 1 0 1 NA
CIGNA Governn DME MAC Alabama, Arkan 1 0 1 NA
NHIC Corp DME MAC Connecticut, Dit 1 0 1 NA
National Govern DME MAC Illinois, Indiana, 1 b 1 NA
Independence iBOT 4000 Mobility
System 1 0 0
Infrared Therapy Devices 0. 0 0
Infusion Pumps 1 0 0 NHIC Corp DME MAC Connecticut, DiE 1 0 1 NA
CIGNA Govern DME MAC Alabama, Arkan 1 0 1 NA
Noridian Admini DME MAC Alaska, America 1 0 1 NA
National Govern DME MAC Illinois, Indiana, 1 0 1 NA
Intrapulmonary Percussive Ventilator
lPV) 0 0 0 NHIC Corp DME MAC Connecticut, Dir 0 NA NA NA
CIGNA Governn DME MAC :Alabama, Arkan S NA NA NA
Nordian Admini DME MAC Alaska, America 0 NA NA NA
National Govern DME MAC Illinois, Indiana, S NA NA NA
Mobility Assistive Equipment (MAE)
10: 0a
Nebulized Beta Andrenergic Agonist
Therapy for Lung Diseases
No NCD is appr 5 0
Noncontact Normothermic Wound
Therapy (NNWT) 0 0 1 Wisconsin Phys Carrier, MAC A, Wisconsin, Illino B 0 1 Journals
Non-implantable Pelvic Floor
Electnical Stimulator 1 0 0 National Govern Fl, Carrier, MAC Indiana, Illinois, 1 1 1 Journals
0 NHIC Corp MAC A, MAC B Maine, New Har 1 1 1 Journals
Wisconsin Phys Carrier, MAC B Wisconsin, lino 1 1 1 Journals
Osteogenic Stimulators 1 0 0 Fint Coast Ser MAC B Florida, Puerto F 1 1 1 NA
Pneumatic Compression Devices 1 0 0 CIGNA Governs DME MAC Alabama, Akan 1 1 1 NA
Noridian Admin DME MAC Alaska, America 1 1 1NA
NHIC Corp DME MAC Connecticut, Die 1 1 1 NA
National Govern 0ME MAC .Illinois, Indiana, 1 1 1 NA
Self-Contained Pacemaker Monitors
1 0 0
pech Generating Devices 1 0 0 Noridian Admini DME MAC Alaska, America 1. 0.1 NA
CIGNA Governn DME MAC Alabama, Arkan 1 1 NA
NHIC Corp DME MAC Connecticut, Dir 1 0 1 NA
National Govern DME MAC Illinois, Indiana, 1 1 NA
Tinnitus Masking 0
Vagus Nerve Stimulation (VNS) 1 0 0 .TrailBlazer Healt MAC Part A, MA Colorado, New I 1. 0 1 Journals
Table 3. Diagnostic Laboratory Tests
NCD LCD
UmItations Umlitatons
Coverd (OK MECAC ontrctordIftereetto different to Baso
NCD title TA (0=N, 1=Y) Contractor States Covered? N D? otherLCDa? to aisof
(d-different, (-dfferent,
i1same) iame)
Alpha-fetoprotein 1 0 a
Blood Counts 1 0 0
Blood Glucose Testin 0 0 Palmetto GBA Fl North Carolna 1 1 0 Burtis and AshA
Carcisoembryonic antigen 1 0 0
Collagen Crosslinks 0 0
Diagnostic Pap Smears 1 0 0 Palmetto GBA F South Carolina, 1 1 1 Carr B. Bradsha
Digoxin Therapeutic Drug Assay 1 0 0
Fecal Occult Blood Test 1 1 0 Palmetto GBA FI North Caroline 1 0 0 Fauci AS Braur
Pinnacle Busine Carrier, F Arkansas, Louis 1 0 0 American Socie
National Govern Fl, Carer, M IndianaIinois, OCMS
Palmetto GBA MAC Part A Califomia, Amer 1 1 0 CMS
First Coast Ser MAC PartA MA Florida, Puerto F 1 0 0 Faui. A., Brau
NHIC Corp MAC Part B Maine, Now Hart 0 CMS
Gamma Glutamyl Transferase 1 0 0
Glyciated Hemoglobin/Glycated Protein 1 0 0
Hepatitis Panel/Acute Hepatitis Panel 1 0 0
Histocompatibility Testin 1 0 0
Human Chorionic Gonadotrepin 1 0 0
Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HfV)
Testing (Diagnosis) 1 0 0
Human lmmunodeficiency Virus (HM
Testing (Prognosis Including Monitoring) 1 0 0
Human Tumor Steml Cell Drug Sensitivity
Assays 0 0 0 Palmetto GBA Camer South Carolina, 0 1 1 Journals
LUpid Testing 1 0 0 National Govern Fl. Carrier, MAC Indiana, illinois, 1 0 1 Journals
Lymphocyte Mitogen Response Assays 1 0 0 National Govern Fl, MAC Part A, Indiana, Illinois, 0 0 1 Journals
Highrnark Medic MAC Part A, MA Delaware, Distrk 0 0 1 Bernstein 1, U J
Partial ThromboplastinTime (PTT) 1 0 0 National Govem Fl. MAC Part A, Indiana, lilinois, 1 0 1 Journals
Pharmacogenomic Testing for Warfann
Response 1 00
ProstateSpecificAntigen. .. 1 0 0 Palmetto GBA MAC Part B Califomia, Amer 1 0 0 Journals
TrailBlazer Heah MAC Part AMA Colorado, Newti 1 0 0 TrailBloar adog
National Govern F Indiana, Illinois, 1 0 0 Journals
Protrombin Time (Pt) 1 B 0 National Govem Ft, MAC Part A, Indiana, Inos, 1 0 1 Journals
Saroogic Testing for Acquired
Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) 1 0 0
Serum Iron Studies 1 0 0
ThyroidTesting 1 0 0
Tumor Antgentylrnmmunoasay -CA 125 1 0 0
Turnor Antigen by immunoassay - CA 15-
3/CA 27.2 1 0 0
Tumor Antigen by Immunoassay - CA 19-9 1 0 0
Urine Culture. Bacterial 1 0 0
Table 4. Physician's Services
NCD LCD
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Assessing Patient's S.uitablty for
Electrical Nerve Stimulatlon Therapy





Carotid body FResection/Carotid Bod
Denervation
Cellular Therapy.
Chelation Therapy for Treatment of
Atheroscierosisn
Cochlostomy with Neurovascular
Transplant for Meniere's Disease
Collagen Meniscos Implant
Colonic Irigation
Deep Brain Stimulation for Essential
Tremor and Parkinson's Disease
Dermal Inlections for the Treatment of
Facial Lipodystrophy Syndrome (LDS)




.. .. ...... .. .... ..  . . . . .. . .
BolecrolcAerson Therapyf or
Treatmen of Alcoholism
ectrocal Simulalan (ESi and
Bectromgnetic Therap tan the
Teatment ofWounds





Monitoring Coring Open-Hesr Surgery
Ploctrosloep Therapy
Electrmtherapy for Treatment of Facial
Noeana lysis (Bell's Puisy)
Ethylenediamine-Terra-Acetic (POTA)
Chelation Therapy for Treatment of
Atherosclerosis
Paternal ConterpuIsation EU P
Therapy for Severe Angina
Extracorporeal Photopheress
Pabric Wrapping at Abdomina.
Aneurysms
Fluidized Therapy Dry Heat for Certain
Musculoskeletal Disorders
Gastnc Balloon forTreatment of
Dbesity





0 NHICCorp.MAC Pact B, MAMaine, NewHai
....... . .. ............. ................. ...........
1 Biofeedback the P0: 0 Wisconsin Phys Carrier Wisconsin, Ilins
First Coast Serv MAC Part B, MA Florida, Puerto I
Cahaba Govemi MAC Part A Alabarna, Georg
National GovemFi, Carrier Indiana, Illinois,




0 Wisconsin Phys Carrier Wisconsin, Ilino
0
0 EDTA cheation .0 0 Trailblazer Healt MAC Part B, MA Colorado, New
0 While there are 





1 High energy pui
0 Electrical aversr
1 ES and electrrr
1 1t .. omals
1'
1'
1*1.. . .. . .. . . . ..














P National Goven Fl, Caroer Indiana, Illinois,
0 a
0 O cPalmetto GBA Fl, MAC Part A North Carolina, l
National Govem F, Carner, MAC Indiana, Ilinois,
NHIC Corp MAC Part, MA Maine, New Har
Highmank Medic MAC Part B, MA Delaware, Distru
P............e. CPinnacle Busine Fl, aier Arkansas, Louis
Cahaba GBA, LI RHHI Colorado, Distnei
0 0 National Govem Fl, Cader, MAC Indiana, Illinois,
PaImetto GBA MAC Part A, F California, Amer
First Coast Serv MAC Part A Flonda, Puerto F
NHIC Corp MAC Part B, MA Maine, New Har
Wisconsin Phys MAD Part A. Fi Alaska Alabamt
0 I Pinnacle Busine FI Louisiana, Missi
Cahaba GBA, U MAD Part A Alabama, Georg
National Govem Fl. Carner, MAC diana, Illinois.
NHIC Corp MAC Part B, MA Maine, New Han
Cahaba GBA, LI RHHI Colorado, Distra
.Wisonsin Phys Carnier, MAC A, Wisconsin Ilin
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1.. .. ..
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1 The EEG monic 0 0
0 Medicare does r 0 0
0 Until scien.fic a 0 0 National Govem FI. Card, MAC Indiana, Illinois.
Palmetto GBA MAC Part A, Fl California, Amer
First Coast Serv MAC Part A Flonda, Puerto
NIC Co.rp MAC Part B, MA Maine, New Har
Wisconsin Phys MAC Part A, FI Alaska, Alahame
0Elctrotherapy ft
0 The use of EDT
1 See policy




0 0 First Coast Se MAC Part A Floida. Puerto F
Pinnacle Busine Cader, Fl Arkansas, Louis
Palmetto GBA MAC Part B California, Amer
Trl~lazer Healt MAC Part A, MA Colorado, New I
Cahaba GBA, L MAC Part A Alabama, Georg
0 0
0 0
1 Use of fluidized 0 0 PalmettoGBA Fl, MAC Part A North Carolina,
National Govem Fl, Carer, MAC Indiana, Illinois,
NHIC Corp MAC Part B, MA Maine, New Har
First Coast Serv MAC Part A, MA Flonda, Puerto 
0 The use of thog D 0 Wisconsin Phys MAC Part A Iowa, Kansas, iv
Palmetto GBA MAC Part B California Northi
National Govern FI/Carrier/MAC I Indiana, Illinois,
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Limitations Limitations





Heat Treatment, Including the Use of
Diathermy and Ultra-Sound for
Pulmonary Conditions
Hemodialysis for Treatment of
Schizophrenia
Hyperbaric Oxygen Therapy
Hyperthermua for Treatment of Cancer
Implantation of Anti-Gastroesophageal
Reflux Device
Induced Lesions of Nerve Tracts










Ocular Photodynamic Therapy (OPT)
Outpatient Intravenous Insulin
Treatment





Prolotherapy, Joint Sclerotherapy, and
Ligamentous Injections with Sclerosing
Agents











Treatment of Actinic Keratosis
Treatment of Decubitus Ulcers
0 Gastric freezing
1 GastrophotogrL







1 Intraocular phot0 There is no scie
1 Medicare recogt
1 See policy
0 CMAS has detern
1 See policy




0 0 Cahaba GBA, U MAC Part A, RH Alabama, Georg
Palmetto GBA Fl. MAC Part A North Carolina,'
National Govem Fl. Carrier, MAC Indiana, flinois.
NHIC Corp MAC Part S, MA Maine, New Har
Wisconsin Phys Carrier, MAC Pa Wisco nin, Ifino
Highmark Medic MAC Part B, MA Delaware, Distri
Pinnacle BusiIne Fl. Carer Arkansas. Louis
Palmetto GSA RHHI Alabama, Arkan
First Coast Sev MAC Part A, MA Florida, Puerto F
0 0 National Govem Fl. Career, MAC Indiana, illimois,
Palmetto GSA MAC Part A, Ft California, Amer
First Coast Sev MAC Part A Florida, Puerto F
NHIC Corp MAC Part 8, MA Maine, New Her
Wisconsin Phys MAC Part A FI Alaska, Alabarmt
1 0 First Coast Serv MAC Part A, MA Florida, Puerto F
Palmetto GSA Fl North Carolina,:
National Govem Fl, Canter, MAC Indiana, Illinois.
0 o
0 0
0 0 NondIan Admin Carmer, MAC Pa Alaska. Oregon,





0 0 Palmetto GSA F North Carolina,
CIGNA Govermn Career North Carolina, I
Pinnacle Buine Carrier Arkansas, Louis
National GovemFl, Carrier, MAC Indiana, Illnois,
First Coast Serv MAC Part A, MA Florida. Puerto )
Wisconsin Phys MAC Part B Iowa, Kansas, Ow
NHIC, Corp MAC Part Maine. New Har
0 National GovemFl, Carer, MAC Indiana, Illinois,
0 0 National GovemFl, Carmer, MAC Indiana, Ilnois,
Palmetto GSA MAC Part A, FI Calfomia, Amer
First Coast Serv MAC Part A Florida, Puerto f
NHIC Corp MAC Part B MA Maine. New Her
Wisconsin Phys MAC Part A F Alaska, AlabamE
0 1 First Coast Srv MAC Part A MA Florda, Puerto F

































0 See policy 0 0
0 Oxygen (95 perc 0 0
0 Since the morta 0 0
1 in view of recorr 0 0
0 The medical eft
1 See policy
1 Payment may b
1 Open and lapan
1 Therapeutic eml
0 The Centers for
0 Regardless of tl
0 Aftier review of tIf
0 Transsexual sunt
0 It is not covered
1 No limitations
1: Hydrntherapy M
0 Palmetto GBA MAC Part S Califomia, Amer









o Highrark Medic MAC Part A, MA Delaware, Distre
Noridian Admin MAC Part B Arizona, Montar
0
0 1 1 CMS
0 1 1 CMS
1 1 O CMS
1 0 0TOtferLid
_ .
Table 5. Diagnostic Tests
NCD LCD
Umitations Umitations
NCD tie Covered (0N TA (N MEDCAC Contractor States Covered? different to different to Base ofNC il A(=,1=)Contractor Stte NCD? other LCDs?1=Y) (t=N, 1=Y) Type (0different, (0=different, Decision
1=same) 1=sane)
Ambulatory Blood Pressure Monitoring 1 1 1
Ambulatory EEG Monitoring 1 0 0 Pinnacle Busine Carder, F Arkansas, Louis 1 0 1 Journals
Wisconsin Phys MAC Part B Iowa, Kansas, 1 0 1 Journals
NHIC Corp MAC Part A. M Maine, New Hai 1 0 1 Journals
Cardiac Output Monitoring by Thoracic
Electrical Bioimpedance (TEB) 1 0 0 National Goverr Fl, Carder, MAC Indiana. Illinois, 1 0 0 Journals
Palmetto GBA MAC Part A California. Amer 1 0 0 Journals
CIGNA Governr Carrier North Carolina 1 0 0 Journals
TrailBlazer Heal MAC Part A, M/ Colorado, New 1 1 0
First Coast Ser MAC Part A, M/ Florida, Puerto f 1 0 0 Journals
Cardiac Pacemaker Evaluation Services 1 0 0
Cardiointegram (CIG) as an Alternative to
Stress Test or Thallium Stress Test 0 0 0
Cavernous Nerves by Electrical Stimulation
with Penile Plethsmography 0_ 0 0
Challenge Ingestion Food Testing 1 0 0 Wisconsin Phys MAC Part A, M; Alaska, Alabam 1 0 1 Journals
Computed Tomography 1 1 0 National Goverr Fl, Carrier, MAC Indiana, Illinois, 1 0 1 Journals
Computer Enhanced Perimetry 1 0 0
Cytogenetic Studies 1 0 0 CIGNA Governr Carser North Carolina 1 0 0 Journals, CMS
Noridian Admini MAC Parl B, Ca Alaska, Oregon, 1 0 0 Joumnals
Palmetto GBA MAC Part B Califomnia, Amer 1 0 0 Joujmals
Wisconsin Phys MAC Part A, M/ Alaska, Alabami 1 0 0 Joumnals
Cytotoxic Food Tests 0 0 0 Wisconsin Phys Fl Alaska, Alabam; 0 1 1 Journals
Diagnostic Breath Analyses 1 0 0
Digital Subtraction Angiography 1 0 0
Displacement Cardiography 1 0 0
Electrocardiographic Services 1 0 0 Palmetto GBA Fl North Carolina, 1 1 1 CMS
Electron Microscope 1 0 0
Electronecephalographic (EEG) Monitoring
During Open-Heart Surgery 0 0 0
Endothelial Cell Photography 1 0 0
Esophageal Manometry 1 0 0
Evoked Response Tests 1 0
Food Allergy Testing and Treatment 0 0 0 First Coast Serv MAC Part B Florida, Puerto I 0 1 1 CMS
Gravlee Jet Washer 1 0 0
Hair Analysis 0 0 B CIGNA Govern Carrier Idaho, North Ca 0 1 1 Journals, DMS
Heartsbreath Test for Heart Transplant
Rejection 0 0 0
Hemorheograph 1 0 1
HIS Bundle Study 1 0 0_ _1
Mammograms 1 0 S Wisconsin Phys Carrier Wisconsin, Illinc 1 0 0
National Goverr Fl, Carrier, MAC Indiana. Illinois, 1 0 0 Journals
NHIC, Corp. MAC Part B, M/ Maine, New Har 1 a 0 Joumals
Palmetto GBA FI South Carolina, 1 0 0 Journals, CMS
TrailBlazer Healt Carrier, MAC Pa Virginia, Colora< 1 0 0
First Coast Serv MAC Part B, M; Florida, Puerto 1 1 0 0
Microvolt T-Wave Aternans (MTWA) 1 0 0
Noninvasive Tests of Carotid Function 1 0 0 Highmark Medk MAC Part A. M/ Delaware. Distri 1 0 0
Palmetto GBA MAC Part B, Ca California, Amer 1 0 0 Journals
Pinnacle Busine Carrier Arkansas, Louis 1 0 0 Journals
National Goverr Fl, Carrier, MAC Indiana. Illinois, 1 0 0 Journals
Wisconsin Phys Carrier, MAC Pa Alaska, Alabam; 1 0 0 Journals
Nuclear Radiology Procedure 1 0 0
PET for Perfusion of the Heart 1 0 0 Palmetto GBA Carver Ohio, West Virgi 1 0 0 Journals
National Goverr Fl, Carrier, MAC Indiana, Illinois, 1 0 0 Journals
NHIC, Corp. MAC Part B, M/ Maine, New Har 1 0 0 Joumals
First Coast Serv MAC Part A. M/ Florida, Puerto 1 1 1 0 CMS
TrailBlazer Heali Carrier, MAC Pa Virginia, Colorac 1 1 0 CMS
Plethysmography 1 0 0
Positron Emission Tomography (FDG) for
Oncologic Conditions 1 0 1 TrailBlazer Heal Carrier, MAC PViana, Illoi. 1 1 1 CMuS
Positron Emission Tomography (NaF-1 8) to
Identify Bone Metastasis of Cancer 0 0 0
Positron Emission Tomography (PET)
Scans Under review 0 1 First Coast Serv MAC Part A, MI Puerto Rico, Virn 1 0 1 NA
Single Photon Emission Computed
Tomography (SPECT) 1 0 0 NHIC, Corp MAC Part B, M/ Maine, New Hat 1 01 1 Other LCDs
Stereotaxic Depth Electrode Implantation 1 0 B
Sweat Test 1 0 0
Thermography 0 0 0 Pinnacie Busine Fl, Carrier Arkansas, Louis 0 1 1 Journals
Highmark Medici MAC Part A, M/l Delaware, Distri, 0 1 1
Palmetto GBA MAC Part B, Ca California, Amea 0 1 1 Joumals
First Coast Serv MAC Part A Florida, Puerto 1 0 1 1 Joumals
National Goverr Fl, Carrier, MAC Indiana, Illinois, 0 1 1 Journals
I CIGNA Governr Carrier North Carolina 0 1 1 1 Journals
Transillumination Light Scanning or
Diaphanography 0 0 0
Uroflowmetric Evaluations 1 0 a0
Vabra Aspirator 0 0 0















































Table 7. State Statistics
Number of Level I and Population Ranking (Number of
State Schools of Number of GDP per Level 2 Density Level 1 and 2 TraumaMedicine physicians (1) capita (2) Trauma . Centers adjusted for
























































































































































1) Doesn't include self employed doctors. Based on United States Department of Labor,
Occupational Employment Statistics, May 2009
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Table 9. Regressions for Sub-analysis
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Interviews with Contractor Medical Directors (CMDs)
Interview 1. Dr. George Waldmann, former Contractor Medical Director
of Noridian Administrative Services, Medicare Part B. August, 2010
1. According to your experience, are the majority of LCDs for a specific
procedure issued before the corresponding NCD? Do NCDs come later after the
necessity to have a policy becomes national?
Many LCDs are issued before NCDs. Once many contractors have issued a
series of LCDs describing the same procedure, CMS often considers the
necessity to issue a NCD. The original idea of LCDs was to have a mechanism
to respond to coverage issues specific to a location.
2. What are the main reasons to issue an LCD in the cases where there is already
an NCD?
If there is already an NCD in place, the main reason to issue an LCD is to
define the CPT and ICD-9 codes that apply to the procedure. I have suggested
to CMS that they should issue the covered ICD-9 codes together with the NCD
in order for all contractors to have the same covered codes at the national
level. Unfortunately, today different contractors may apply different codes for
the same procedures. One example is PET Scan policies, where codes and
LCDs present a significant degree of variation among contractors.
3. According to the Medicare Program Integrity Manual Chapter 13-Local
Coverage Determinations (04-25-08) "the DME MACs shall ensure that the
adopted LCDs are identical among the DME MACs" Why is consistency between
LCDs (by different MACs) required for Durable Medical Equipment and not for
other benefit categories?
Consistency is required for DME MACs because they are only four and
administratively is not difficult to achieve it this consistency. For other
benefit categories it is not done because it is difficult to coordinate among
multiple contractors.
4. According to my analysis (based on the CMS Coverage Database), there is
consistency between different DME MACs LCDs (all are the same), however, LCD
criteria and limitations differ from NCDs in many cases. For other benefit
categories LCDs coverage criteria and limitations differ between MACs and
between LCDs and NCDs. According to your opinion, what do you think are the
causes of these discrepancies if LCDs shouldn't differ from NCDs? (In most of the
cases, LCDs narrow the criteria or change limitations without necessarily
contradicting the NCD)
5. According to the same manual, "When an NCD or coverage provision in an
interpretive manual does not exclude coverage for other diagnoses/conditions,
contractors shall allow for individual consideration unless the LCD supports
automatic denial for some or all of those other diagnoses/conditions" Most of
the discrepancies between NCDs and LCDs that I have detected in my study are
of this type (the NCD didn't exclude coverage for certain diagnosis or conditions
while the LCD did). Why do you think this happens?
4, 5.Most LCDs are issued as a mechanism to restrict or describe coverage,
using CPT and ICD-9 codes. Without an LCD, contractors can't deny a claim
automatically, but it must be done on a case-by-case basis, which
administratively requires personnel time and other resources, significantly
increasing costs to contractors. Thus, LCDs are issued to reduce contractor's
administrative costs and reduce claim errors. Discrepancies between LCDs
and NCDs can occur because NCDs are often less specific about covered
conditions and limitations and LCDs specify them with specific codes.
6. According to my analysis, some states are more active in issuing LCDs. Which
do you think are the main drivers of LCD issuing activity?
The main drivers of LCD activity are:
- The main reason is to limit payment to medically necessary diagnoses
and conditions by automating legitimate denials.
- A history of abuse and fraud. LCDs are issued to be very specific about
coverage conditions and limitations to avoid payment for areas of abuse
and fraud.
- The Contractor Medical Director (CMD) specialty. Some times LCDs
will be issued in the medical specialty or area of expertise of the CMD.
- More LCDs will be issued in states were contractors have assigned
more personnel to creating and maintaining LCDs. Although CMS used to
encourage large numbers of LCDs this doesn't seem to be the case any
more.
- New procedures, to educate and assist physicians when they are
submitting incorrect claims
7. In your opinion, does the current model to issue LCDs taking into account the
input from the Carrier Advisory Committee (CAC) from each state works? Does
the CAC reflects state-by-state medical practice differences when issuing LCDs?
Are these differences desirable? How does the CAC prioritizes for which
procedures is an LCD required?
Some CACs are more interactive than others and some contractors give much
importance to the CAC-submitted LCD comments than others. The utility of
having a CAC per state is not so great because in the end LCDs don't seem to
reflect state-by-state differences in medical practice. CACs are also a cost to
CASC members who must travel and take time away from their practices with
no remuneration for attending the CAC.,. These costs in time and money
invested in CACs make it difficult for CMDs to convince physicians to join
CACs. In many cases the physicians who join are not opinion leaders in their
specialties. For these and other reasons CMS and contractors may be moving
toward having only a single CAC for each jurisdiction.
8. Why do some contractors issue LCDs only for some states of their jurisdiction
and not all?
I haven't seen this happen.
9. In your opinion, does Medicare Contractor Reform will cause more
homogeneous policies between states or more divergent ones?
Yes, Medicare Contractor Reform should produce more homogeneous policies
due to decreasing numbers of Medicare contractors and increasing the
numbers of states within each contractor jurisdiction.
10. Did you have an experience of issuing an LCD that challenged the standard
of practice? Did the LCD have to be changed later?
Yes, I and other CMDs have personally experienced a lot of pressure from
consumers and industry when policies have restricted coverage due to
questionable efficacy and a lack of published evidence for the procedure.
11. According to the Medicare Program Integrity Manual, "Contractors shall
implement new Least Costly Alternative (LCA) determinations through an LCD.
"Least Costly Alternative" is a national policy provision that shall be applied by
contractors when determining payment for all durable medical equipment
(DME). Contractors have the discretion to apply this principle to payment for
non-DME services as well" Why is the LCA principle mandatory only for DME
and not for other benefit categories?
The "Least Costly Alternative" (LCA) principle is very difficult to implement
because of pressure from industry and patients. Also, courts have recently
ruled against LCAs and contractors have had to rescind previously existing
LCA LCDs.
12. According to my analysis, from 193 procedures with NCDs currently in effect
(from the following benefit categories: Inpatient Hospital Services, Durable
Medical Devices, Diagnostic Laboratory Tests, Physician Services and Diagnostic
Tests), only 10 required Technology Assessments and only 12 required a
Medicare Evidence Development & Coverage Advisory Committee (MEDCAC),
leaving the majority of national decisions to the discretion of CMS authorities.
According to your opinion, should there be more decisions based on Technology
Assessments and MEDCACs? What is the main reason most decisions are not
based on them?
I suppose the main reason is that CMS has limited resources and Technology
Assessments and MEDCACs are costly. This is also the reason why a lot of the
policy activity is carried on at the local level, primarily because LCDs can be
implemented faster than NCDs. However, the level of expertise at the local
level is usually less than at the national level. Also the evaluation mechanism
is more structured and slower at the national level. In my experience, the
medical device and drug industries prefer to try to convince local contractors
of the benefits of their technologies at the local level instead of CMS, because
it is easier in terms of evidence required and time invested. Once a contractor
issues a policy in favor of a procedure, other contractors are pressured to do
the same.
Do you allow that your opinions appear on my thesis, which will be a publicly
available document?
Yes
Do you want to maintain your identity as confidential while allowing your
opinions to appear on my thesis?
I allow the disclosure of my identity
Interview 2. Contractor Medical Director, August 2010
1. According to your experience, are the majority of LCDs for a specific
procedure issued before the corresponding NCD? Do NCDs come later after
the necessity to have a policy becomes national?
Not necessarily. The issuing process of NCDs and LCDs are independent of
each other. Sometimes LCDs are issued before NCDs (or without any NCD)
and sometimes the NCD is issued first.
2. What are the main reasons to issue an LCD in the cases where there is
already an NCD?
To specify the billing codes(which are not specified in NCDs) and to define
the circumstances under which automatic coverage denials apply.
3. According to the Medicare Program Integrity Manual Chapter 13-Local
Coverage Determinations (04-25-08) "the DME MACs shall ensure that the
adopted LCDs are identical among the DME MACs". Why is consistency
between LCDs (by different MACs) required for Durable Medical Equipment
and not for other benefit categories?
Because many of the DME suppliers operate nationwide and in that way
there is no discrimination for access to them among beneficiaries from
different regions.
4. According to my analysis (based on the CMS Coverage Database), there is
consistency between different DME MACs LCDs (all are the same), however,
LCD criteria and limitations differ from NCDs in many cases. For other
benefit categories LCDs coverage criteria and limitations differ between
MACs and between LCDs and NCDs. According to your opinion, what do you
think are the causes of these discrepancies if LCDs shouldn't differ from
NCDs? (In most of the cases, LCDs narrow the criteria or change limitations
without necessarily contradicting the NCD).
The main difference between NCDs and LCDs is that NCDs apply
nationally, where LCDs are at local contractor discretion and may address
a variety of things, including clarification of an LCD, ie, specific codes, etc.
LCDs specify exclusions (usually defining the billing codes allowed for
coverage) not specified by NCDs, according to the contractor's specific
requirements. For example, NCDs for PET Scans have caused a lot of
differences between contractors because each one defines different billing
codes for the conditions mentioned in the NCD.
5. According to the same manual, "When an NCD or coverage provision in an
interpretive manual does not exclude coverage for other diagnoses/conditions,
contractors shall allow for individual consideration unless the LCD supports
automatic denial for some or all of those other diagnoses/conditions" Most of
the discrepancies between NCDs and LCDs that I have detected in my study are
of this type (the NCD didn't exclude coverage for certain diagnosis or conditions
while the LCD did). Why do you think this happens?
Most of the differences between LCDs and NCDs are in the form of exclusions
not specified in NCDs. This happens because NCDs don't specify billing codes
and contractors determine exclusions according to their local circumstances,
as long as they don't conflict with NCDs. This only applies to those NCDs and
LCDs that address the same topic, of course.
6. According to my analysis, some states are more active in issuing LCDs. Which
do you think are the main drivers of LCD issuing activity?
In no particular order...
- The economic and human resources that the contractor has available
to issue LCDs. Contractors with more economic and human resources
available for LCDs will usually issue more LCDs. Each LCD consumes
resources not only when it is issued but also later because it has to be
reviewed and enforced.
- Contractor's philosophy towards coverage policies. Some contractors
prefer to leave the coverage decisions in the hands of physicians, others have
a different approach to coverage decisions.
- How clear are the NCDs? Sometimes the contractor doesn't need a
new LCD because the NCD is clear and serves its needs.
- Fraud. In states with a greater history of fraud, more LCDs are issued,
to make clear the circumstances under which coverage will be automatically
denied and in that way reduce fraud.
- Perceived need for an LCD. As examples and not all inclusive, in states
with low population density, low number of Trauma Centers, low number of
physicians and few or no Schools of Medicine, the need for LCDs may be lower
than in states with the opposite characteristics.
7. In your opinion, does the current model to issue LCDs taking into account the
input from the Carrier Advisory Committee (CAC) from each state works? Does
the CAC reflects state-by-state medical practice differences when issuing LCDs?
Are these differences desirable? How does the CAC prioritizes for which
procedures is an LCD required?
The issuing of LCDs is not a democratic process, the decision is ultimately
made by the contractor, mainly by the CMD. Usually the CMD consults with a
variety of sources before the meeting with the CAC. CAC meetings take place
approximately every four months. They last about two hours with
approximately 30 physicians from the specialties impacted by the particular
LCDs discussed in each meeting. Each LCD takes about 90 days to complete. I
think that in the future there are going to be 1 or 2 CACs per contractor.
The CMD prioritizes which LCDs to issue according to the following criteria:
- New technologies that might pose a risk to the Medicare funds.
- Procedures with perceived overutilization
- Procedures where there is concern for abuse
- The number and type of claims received
8. Why do some contractors issue LCDs only for some states of their jurisdiction
and not all?
Because in the past there were more contractors. After Contracting Reform,
LCDs will be issued for all the states of the contractor's jurisdiction.
9. In your opinion, does Medicare Contractor Reform will cause more
homogeneous policies between states or more divergent ones?
Contracting Reform will cause more homogeneous policies.
10. Did you have an experience of issuing an LCD that challenged the standard
of practice? Did the LCD have to be changed later?
Yes, as long as the LCD. is based on clinical evidence from respected journals
or expert opinion, it will prevail. However, if other contractors cover a
procedure that we don't cover, it will build pressure on us to cover it.
11. According to the Medicare Program Integrity Manual, "Contractors shall
implement new Least Costly Alternative (LCA) determinations through an LCD.
"Least Costly Alternative" is a national policy provision that shall be applied by
contractors when determining payment for all durable medical equipment
(DME). Contractors have the discretion to apply this principle to payment for
non-DME services as well" Why is the LCA principle mandatory only for DME
and not for other benefit categories?
LCAs are not used anymore even for DMEs, mainly due to a court
case/decision and legal pressure from the medical device and pharmaceutical
industry.
12. According to my analysis, from 193 procedures with NCDs currently in effect
(from the following benefit categories: Inpatient Hospital Services, Durable
Medical Devices, Diagnostic Laboratory Tests, Physician Services and Diagnostic
Tests), only 10 required Technology Assessments and only 12 required a
Medicare Evidence Development & Coverage Advisory Committee (MEDCAC),
leaving the majority of national decisions to the discretion of CMS authorities.
According to your opinion, should there be more decisions based on Technology
Assessments and MEDCACs? What is the main reason most decisions are not
based on them?
TAs and MEDCACs are expensive, that's why they are only used in NCDs and
even at a national level, they are used only for special cases. In addition to
being costly, this process is lengthy, and many times there is insufficient
evidence to sustain a majority consensus opinion.
Do you allow that your opinions appear on my thesis, which will be a publicly
available document? Yes
Do you want to maintain your identity as confidential while allowing your
opinions to appear on my thesis? Yes, absolutely.
Interview 3. Dr. Richard Baer, Contractor Medical Director, National
Government Services, August 2010
1. According to your experience, are the majority of LCDs for a specific
procedure issued before the corresponding NCD? Do NCDs come later after the
necessity to have a policy becomes national?
There is not a direct correlation between the time frames for issuing NCDs
and issuing LCDs. NCDs are issued to establish whether something is covered
or not, and usually don't assign billing codes. LCDs define under which
circumstances the items already covered by NCDs are reimbursed.
2. What are the main reasons to issue an LCD in the cases where there is already
an NCD?
To assign billing codes and in that way automate coverage decisions in the
computer system. Assigning billing codes at a national level would be too
much work for CMS, so it lets contractors to decide on that.
3. According to the Medicare Program Integrity Manual Chapter 13-Local
Coverage Determinations (04-25-08) "the DME MACs shall ensure that the
adopted LCDs are identical among the DME MACs" Why is consistency between
LCDs (by different MACs) required for Durable Medical Equipment and not for
other benefit categories?
Since there are only four DME contractors, is easier for them to agree on
coverage policies. Instead of issuing NCDs, which is very costly to CMS, it
allows DME contractors to issue LCDs, which are the same for all and would
be the equivalent to issue an NCD. For other benefit categories, consistency is
not required because when the whole coverage system was planned, the idea
was to let contractors adapt coverage policies according to the local
standards of medical practice. But now, there is no reason to have variation in
medical practice across states, because medical practice is based on evidence
and it should be the same at a national level.
4. According to my analysis (based on the CMS Coverage Database), there is
consistency between different DME MACs LCDs (all are the same), however, LCD
criteria and limitations differ from NCDs in many cases. For other benefit
categories LCDs coverage criteria and limitations differ between MACs and
between LCDs and NCDs. According to your opinion, what do you think are the
causes of these discrepancies if LCDs shouldn't differ from NCDs? (In most of the
cases, LCDs narrow the criteria or change limitations without necessarily
contradicting the NCD)
5. According to the same manual, "When an NCD or coverage provision in an
interpretive manual does not exclude coverage for other diagnoses/conditions,
contractors shall allow for individual consideration unless the LCD supports
automatic denial for some or all of those other diagnoses/conditions" Most of
the discrepancies between NCDs and LCDs that I have detected in my study are
of this type (the NCD didn't exclude coverage for certain diagnosis or conditions
while the LCD did). Why do you think this happens?
4 and 5. I wouldn't call these discrepancies, since an LCD should never
contradict an NCD. What an LCD does, is to define more precisely coverage
exclusions not specified on an NCD, according to detected aberrant billing
patterns by the contractor. CMS leaves these exclusion decisions open to the
contractor's discretion. LCDs are different between different contractors or
different states because sometimes more active members in the CACs
influence the accepted billing codes according to their specialties.
6. According to my analysis, some states are more active in issuing LCDs. Which
do you think are the main drivers of LCD issuing activity?
- Ambition of the CMD
- Staff available to the CMD for LCD issuing purposes
- More experienced CMDs are very active in issuing LCDs
- Contractors perform data analysis to detect aberrant billing patterns
and compare utilization patterns between states (CMS doesn't perform these
kind of analysis). These aberrant billing patterns drive LCD issuing activity.
- I think issuing more LCDs is good for physicians, contractors and CMS.
7. In your opinion, does the current model to issue LCDs taking into account the
input from the Carrier Advisory Committee (CAC) from each state works? Does
the CAC reflects state-by-state medical practice differences when issuing LCDs?
Are these differences desirable? How does the CAC prioritizes for which
procedures is an LCD required?
The current model works well. Is not that CACs reflect state-by-state medical
practice differences, what happens is that CAC members have different levels
of expertise. CMDs without enough staff or efficient CACs copy other
contractor's LCDs.
The CAC doesn't set the priorities for issuing LCDs. The contractor through its
CMD sets the priorities according to:
- Data analysis of medical review, overutilization and possible abuse.
The CMD gives priority to procedures that represent a significant amount of
money, that have significant clinical value or that pose a significant medical
risk. Contractors issue about 6 to 8 LCDs per session, having 3 sessions per
year.
8. Why do some contractors issue LCDs only for some states of their jurisdiction
and not all?
The discrepancies between LCDs in different states that are serviced by the
same contractor are due in the majority of cases to the state of affairs before
Contracting Reform. Contractor's consolidation has homogenized LCDs that
were previously issued by different contractors. In general, there is
consistency between LCDs in states of the same jurisdiction.
9. In your opinion, does Medicare Contractor Reform will cause more
homogeneous policies between states or more divergent ones?
There will still be differences between states belonging to different
contractors but there will be no longer differences between Medicare Part A
and Part B policies because they will be serviced by the same contractor.
10. Did you have an experience of issuing an LCD that challenged the standard
of practice? Did the LCD have to be changed later?
When you challenge the standard of practice, you have to defend your
position with strong evidence. However, when there is strong political
pressure driven mainly from the industry, sometimes the contractor puts the
LCD on hold.
11. According to the Medicare Program Integrity Manual, "Contractors shall
implement new Least Costly Alternative (LCA) determinations through an LCD.
"Least Costly Alternative" is a national policy provision that shall be applied by
contractors when determining payment for all durable medical equipment
(DME). Contractors have the discretion to apply this principle to payment for
non-DME services as well" Why is the LCA principle mandatory only for DME
and notfor other benefit categories?
Due to recent legal issues, contractors no longer base their LCDs on LCAs.
12. According to my analysis, from 193 procedures with NCDs currently in effect
(from the following benefit categories: Inpatient Hospital Services, Durable
Medical Devices, Diagnostic Laboratory Tests, Physician Services and Diagnostic
Tests), only 10 required Technology Assessments and only 12 required a
Medicare Evidence Development & Coverage Advisory Committee (MEDCAC),
leaving the majority of national decisions to the discretion of CMS authorities.
According to your opinion, should there be more decisions based on Technology
Assessments and MEDCACs? What is the main reason most decisions are not
based on them?
Many NCDs are not issued for new technologies, so they don't require a TA or
a MEDCAC. Procedures where medical devices are used (as opposed to drugs)
are more subject to NCDs where TAs or MEDCACs are used, since the FDA
approval for medical devices assess the safety of the device more than its
clinical value, so further clinical evidence is needed to justify coverage,
usually based on TAs or MEDCACs.
Do you allow that your opinions appear on my thesis, which will be a publicly
available document?
Yes
Do you want to maintain your identity as confidential while allowing your
opinions to appear on my thesis?
I agree to disclose my identity
Interview 4. Contractor Medical Director, August 2010
1. According to your experience, are the majority of LCDs for a specific
procedure issued before the corresponding NCD? Do NCDs come later after the
necessity to have a policy becomes national?
There is not a direct correlation between the time frames for issuing NCDs
and issuing LCDs. LCDs are issued to clarify coverage issues that are
problematic for providers and that increase the number of claims. These
issues are not specific in NCDs.
2. What are the main reasons to issue an LCD in the cases where there is already
an NCD?
To describe indications through billing codes not specified in NCDs.
Applicable billing codes are not contained in NCDs because CMS doesn't have
the economic resources to determine billing codes, which is expensive. That's
why it is left to contractor's discretion.
3. According to the Medicare Program Integrity Manual Chapter 13-Local
Coverage Determinations (04-25-08) "the DME MACs shall ensure that the
adopted LCDs are identical among the DME MACs". Why is consistency between
LCDs (by different MACs) required for Durable Medical Equipment and not for
other benefit categories?
This is a question for CMS.
4. According to my analysis (based on the CMS Coverage Database), there is
consistency between different DME MACs LCDs (all are the same), however, LCD
criteria and limitations differ from NCDs in many cases. For other benefit
categories LCDs coverage criteria and limitations differ between MACs and
between LCDs and NCDs. According to your opinion, what do you think are the
causes of these discrepancies if LCDs shouldn't differ from NCDs? (In most of the
cases, LCDs narrow the criteria or change limitations without necessarily
contradicting the NCD)
5. According to the same manual, "When an NCD or coverage provision in an
interpretive manual does not exclude coverage for other diagnoses/conditions,
contractors shall allow for individual consideration unless the LCD supports
automatic denial for some or all of those other diagnoses/conditions" Most of
the discrepancies between NCDs and LCDs that I have detected in my study are
of this type (the NCD didn't exclude coverage for certain diagnosis or conditions
while the LCD did). Why do you think this happens?
4 and 5. LCDs don't contradict NCDs, they clarify coverage limitations not
specified in NCDs.
6. According to my analysis, some states are more active in issuing LCDs. Which
do you think are the main drivers of LCD issuing activity?
The main driver of LCD issuing activity is data analysis of medical necessity
criteria based on:
- Quality of care
- History of claims billing errors
- Billing abuse
- Historical problematic areas
An other driver, secondary to data analysis is budget and staff constraints.
LCDs and LCD edits are very costly to issue, to maintain and to update. Once
you have a new LCD you have to put it in the system. You have to choose very
well which procedures merit an LCD. But once you have an LCD in place, it
diminish the number of claims that have to be attended individually,
decreasing costs for contractors. LCDs diminish claims because the system
automatically looks for billing codes applicable to the procedure and
automatically denies or authorizes claims based on that.
7. In your opinion, does the current model to issue LCDs taking into account the
input from the Carrier Advisory Committee (CAC) from each state works? Does
the CAC reflects state-by-state medical practice differences when issuing LCDs?
Are these differences desirable? How does the CAC prioritizes for which
procedures is an LCD required?
LCDs and CACs reflect differences between states in medical practice. But the
priority of LCDs is data analysis. The CAC works only as an advisor to the
MCD and the contractor. This specific contractor uses work groups composed
of physicians, hospital administrators and advisors on top of the CAC.
8. Why do some contractors issue LCDs only for some states of their jurisdiction
and not all?
This doesn't happen any more. When a contractor has LCDs that apply only
for some states, usually is because other states were previously managed by a
different contractor and they haven't homogenized their policies. But new
policies should be issued for all states serviced by the same contractor.
9. In your opinion, does Medicare Contractor Reform will cause more
homogeneous policies between states or more divergent ones?
Medicare Contractor Reform will produce more consistency between states.
10. Did you have an experience of issuing an LCD that challenged the standard
of practice? Did the LCD have to be changed later?
Not answered.
11. According to the Medicare Program Integrity Manual, "Contractors shall
implement new Least Costly Alternative (LCA) determinations through an LCD.
"Least Costly Alternative" is a national policy provision that shall be applied by
contractors when determining payment for all durable medical equipment
(DME). Contractors have the discretion to apply this principle to payment for
non-DME services as well" Why is the LCA principle mandatory only for DME
and not for other benefit categories?
CMS doesn't allow contractors to use LCA criteria to issue LCDs because
recently there was a legal case (Hays vs Sebelius) won by a drug
manufacturer over a policy issued under LCA criteria.
12. According to my analysis, from 193 procedures with NCDs currently in effect
(from the following benefit categories: Inpatient Hospital Services, Durable
Medical Devices, Diagnostic Laboratory Tests, Physician Services and Diagnostic
Tests), only 10 required Technology Assessments and only 12 required a
Medicare Evidence Development & Coverage Advisory Committee (MEDCAC),
leaving the majority of national decisions to the discretion of CMS authorities.
According to your opinion, should there be more decisions based on Technology
Assessments and MEDCACs? What is the main reason most decisions are not
based on them?
CMS has a limited budget and limited staff, so it is very selective when it uses
a TA or a MEDCAC to issue an NCD.
Do you allow that your opinions appear on my thesis, which will be a publicly
available document?
Yes
Do you want to maintain your identity as confidential while allowing your
opinions to appear on my thesis?
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X. Glossary of abbreviations
AAMC- Association of American Medical Colleges




CED-Coverage with Evidence Development
CMD-Contractor Medical Director
CMS-Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
CPT code-Billing code according to Current Procedural Terminology
DME MAC-Durable Medical Equipment Medicare Administrative Contractor
DME-Durable Medical Equipment
DMERC-Durable Medical Equipment Regional Carrier
ECRI-Emergency Care Research Institute
FAR-Federal Acquisition Regulation




HCFA- Health Care Financing Administration
HCPCS- Healthcare Common Procedure Coding System
HIPPA- Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
HMO-Health Maintenance Organization
ICD-9 code-Billing code according to the International Classification of
Diseases, 9th edition
IPPS-Inpatient Prospective Payment System
LCA-Least Costly Alternative
LCD-Local Coverage Determination
LMRP-Local Medical Review Policy
MAC-Medicare Administrative Contractor
MCO-Managed Care Organization
MEDCAC-Medicare Evidence Development & Coverage Advisory Committee
Medicare Contracting Reform- Provisions contained under section 911 of the
MMA
MedPAC-Medicare Payment Advisory Commission
MMA- Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act
NCD-National Coverage Determination
NIH-National Institutes of Health






RHHI- Regional Home Health and Hospice Intermediary
TA-Technology Assessment
The Act-Social Security Act
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